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Abstract 
Modern societies rely on Information Systems (IS), yet their protection has long 
been considered ineffective.  Researchers and practitioners have struggled to understand 
the persistence of this phenomenon, but both agree that IS management plays a 
significant role.  This paper investigates the relation between practitioners’ perceptions of 
IS management maturity and their perceptions of the effectiveness of Information 
Technology (IT) security.  A cross-sectional survey (N = 68) was conducted to assess 
these perceptions.  Analysis using Partial Least Squares provided evidence of a strong 
relation between these variables.  Specifically, the perceived maturity of IS planning, 
control, and organization practices was positively associated with the perceived 
effectiveness of IT security.  The relation between perceived maturity in IS management 
practices and perceived effectiveness of IT security is discussed, along with contributions 
to research and implications for practice.  Limitations and directions for future research 
are presented. 
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Introduction 
Despite the extensive dependence of our society on Information Systems (IS), 
there is considerable evidence that Information Technology (IT) safeguarding is 
ineffective (Anthes, 1998; Brancheau, Janz, & Wetherbe, 1996; Christie & Goldman, 
2003; Global information security survey 2002, 2002; Kankanhalli, Tan, Teo, & Wei, 
2003; Keefe, 2003; Straub, 1990b; Straub & Welke, 1998; Verton, 2002).  Furthermore, 
poor IT security is not a recent problem.  It was noted in the late 1960s that the security 
of IT assets was often inadequate (Allen, 1968).  Over time, several authors have 
proposed reasons for the persistence of this phenomenon, including: lack of knowledge 
on the part of IS managers, senior management, and end users; lack of tools for security 
managers and system administrators; lack of incentives for senior management to invest 
in IS security; and a general lack of interest from managers and end users (Global 
information security survey 2002, 2002; Goodhue & Straub, 1991; Kankanhalli et al., 
2003; Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992; Machefsky, 1998; Spafford, 1989; Straub & 
Welke, 1998).  However, these reasons are either questioned by other researchers 
(Gollman, Meadows, & Okamoto, 2001) or, individually, provide low explanatory power 
(Goodhue & Straub, 1991). 
Academic and practitioner literatures provide further reason to doubt that lack of 
knowledge, tools, incentives, or interest is entirely responsible for the low level of 
success in securing IS.  First, knowledge about, and tools for, effective IT security 
management are available (Straub, 1986b; Trcek, 2003) and much has been written about 
effective approaches to IT security (Anthes, 1998; Dhillon, 2001; Gollman et al., 2001; 
Kankanhalli et al., 2003; Landwehr, 2001; Loch et al., 1992; Straub, 1990a; Straub & 
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Welke, 1998).  Also, as Cheswick and Bellovin (1994) point out, good security 
principles, on which tools can be based, have been known for more than one hundred 
years.  Security for IT is known to be both necessary and cost effective (Dhillon, 2001; 
Global information security survey 2002, 2002; Power, 2002; Straub, 1986a, 1990a, 
1990b; Straub & Welke, 1998; Wood, 1987).  It has even been noted that good security 
practices can lead to improvements in overall efficiency (Austin & Darby, 2003).  
Finally, interest in IT security is evident from the amount of material appearing in both 
academic and practice literatures (Backhouse & Dhillon, 1996; Briney & Prince, 2002; 
Gollman et al., 2001; Goodhue & Straub, 1991; Straub, 1986b; Troutt, 2002).  So, a lack 
of knowledge, tools, incentives, or interest does not appear to adequately explain the 
enduring deficiencies in IT security.  Despite ongoing efforts, both researchers and 
practitioners consider security for IT to be ineffective, resulting in calls for further 
investigation (Dhillon, 2003; Gollman et al., 2001; Kankanhalli et al., 2003; Straub & 
Welke, 1998). 
While the knowledge and tools may be available, this does not mean that effective 
IT security is easily achieved.  Misidentification of the problem, underestimation of the 
requirements, and lack of rigour in implementing solutions can undermine security 
efforts. 
First, IT security may be misidentified as a purely technical, operational concern.  
However, several authors have pointed out that IT security is fundamentally a 
management problem, rather than a technical matter (Eloff, 1988; Ross & Weill, 2002; 
Trcek, 2003; Wood, 1987; Wylder, 1992).  Loch et al. (1992) notes that it is IS managers 
who are responsible for understanding, and addressing, the threats to an organization’s IT 
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assets.  While there are technological implications, effective IT security is a management 
concern. 
Second, it is possible to underestimate IT security requirements.  One author 
points out that IT security is “extraordinarily complicated” (Austin & Darby, 2003, p. 
120).  The international standard Code of Practice for Information Security Management 
(ISO/IEC 17799:2000, 2000) specifies nine major areas of effective security practice 
(Organizational security, Asset classification and control, Personnel security, Physical 
and environmental security, Communications and operations management, Access 
control, Systems development and maintenance, Business continuity management, and 
Compliance).  Another author (Daughtrey, 2001) highlights eight critical success factors 
for information security management.  Among these are the need for an approach to 
security that is consistent with corporate culture, has visible support from management, 
and offers adequate security-related training and education for the organization’s 
personnel.  Thirteen separate dimensions of effective IT security have also been 
identified (von Solms, 2001).  These include strategic governance, organizational 
governance, policy, best practices, ethics, certification, legal, insurance, personnel, 
awareness, technical, metrics, and audit aspects of IT security management.  The 
complexity of this multifaceted issue is easily underestimated, and addressing the diverse 
aspects of IT security in modern organizations is a non-trivial undertaking. 
Third, insufficient rigour can be an impediment to effective IT security.  
Safeguards are subject to a weak-link phenomenon (Neumann, 1996; Vasishtha, 2002).  
That is, the net effectiveness of any set of safeguards is constrained by the least effective 
member of the set, and as such, a single weak point can invalidate any or all of an 
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organization’s security safeguards.  As a corollary, it can be demonstrated that satisficing 
is a futile strategy for IT security.  That is, implementing only part of a required set of 
safeguards may be no more effective than implementing none of the set.  This principle 
can be applied recursively, so that even minor oversights in the implementation of an 
individual safeguard may seriously compromise its effectiveness, and in turn, an 
organization’s entire IT security strategy. 
In the face of these three issues, the possibility arises that even if knowledge, 
tools, incentives, and interest are present, they may not be adequate to ensure the 
effectiveness of IT security safeguards.  Even if management is convinced of the need for 
IT security, the level of rigour required to properly apply the knowledge and tools can 
undoubtedly exceed that at which an organization normally conducts its affairs.  
Ultimately, the problem may simply be more difficult than many organizations are 
prepared to cope with. 
In a recent study, Kankanhalli et al. (2003) developed and tested an integrative 
model of IS security effectiveness.  The authors examined the influence of three 
organizational variables (organizational size, top management support, and industry type) 
and three mediating, management activity variables (deterrent efforts, deterrent severity, 
and preventive efforts) on the effectiveness of IT security.  They found significant 
relations between the organizational variables and the management activity variables, and 
in turn, between the management activity variables and the effectiveness of IS security. 
Their findings imply that organizational factors, such as management support, and 
management actions, such as the use of deterrents and preventives, can influence the 
effectiveness of IT security. 
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Building on the integrative model of Kankanhalli et al. (2003), which theorizes 
that organizational factors can influence IT security effectiveness, this study will examine 
the influence of IS management maturity, as an organizational factor, on IT security 
effectiveness.  Using the operationalization of IT security effectiveness implemented by 
Kankanhalli et al. (2003), this study examines how IS practitioners’ perceptions of 
sophistication in IS management practices relate to their perceptions of the effectiveness 
of IT security safeguards.  The need for managerial involvement in IT security, combined 
with the complex and exacting efforts required to effectively protect IT assets, suggests 
that a relatively sophisticated approach to IS management may be required to ensure 
effectiveness in IT safeguarding. IS practitioners, as a group, should be informed about 
both IS management practices and the effectiveness of IT security safeguards.  As such, 
their perspectives offer a useful means of assessing these two variables. 
IS management maturity has been used to characterize the sophistication of an 
organization’s IS management practices, and the effectiveness and creativity with which 
those practices are applied (Karimi, Bhattacherjee, Gupta, & Somers, 2000).  As 
organizations mature in their use of IS, management becomes increasingly aware of its 
strategic value, motivating their participation in overseeing the related systems, services, 
and data (Boynton & Zmud, 1987).  The resulting changes in IS management may then 
alter the organization’s ability to perceive security deficiencies, determine remedies, 
correctly implement solutions, and ensure continuing protection.  Raho, Belohlav, and 
Fiedler (1987) imply such an effect in their discussion on the diffusion of personal 
computers.  Additionally, in their study on the effectiveness of IT security, Kankanhalli et 
al. (2003, p. 152) suggests “organizational maturity” as a potential influencing factor.  
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Finally, a correlation has been demonstrated between IT management sophistication1 and 
perceived success with IT (Sabherwal & Kirs, 1994). 
The rest of this chapter provides an overview of IT security effectiveness, 
followed by an historical account of the development of the IS management maturity 
construct.  The chapter concludes with a description of the research question and 
hypothesis. 
IT Security Effectiveness 
While the notion of security implying protection from the undesirable is intuitive, 
to measure its effectiveness in an organization’s IT requires a more precise description.  
Definitions used in the academic literature, while precise, have tended to be narrow in 
their scope.  To address this limitation, a broader characterization that is more reflective 
of typical industry norms will be used. 
IT security effectiveness is conceptualized in this study as the extent to which 
security safeguards are perceived as successfully protecting IT-related hardware, 
software, data, and services from deliberate, accidental, or random threats to 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability. This includes physical, electronic, personnel, 
and policy safeguards.  This is the definition used in this study’s survey (see Appendix 
A). 
 
1 IS management maturity and IS management sophistication are used interchangeably in the literature. 
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To establish this definition of IT security effectiveness, four aspects of IT security 
will be examined here: 
• Threats to IT (deliberate, accidental, and random); 
• Types of IT assets requiring protection (hardware, software, data, and 
services);   
• Types of IT compromises (confidentiality, integrity, and availability); and 
• Types of safeguards (physical, electronic, personnel, and policy). 
 
Threats to IT 
Considering sources of threat, some authors apply a limited range of possibilities.  
IT security is sometimes defined as protecting IT assets only from intentional misuse 
(Kankanhalli et al., 2003; Straub, 1990b).  In this definition, IT security is restricted to 
preventing people with malicious (or at least mischievous) intent from deliberately 
exploiting vulnerabilities to cause harm.  However, this meaning is constrained with 
regards to the possible threats involved.  Random events and human errors can also lead 
to security compromises (Morton & Froh, 1996). 
A broader perspective on IT security threats is provided in the definition used by 
the Canadian Government.  In its view, threats are defined as including “…malicious 
persons or groups, negligent or careless personnel, or … random occurrences and natural 
phenomena” (A guide to risk assessment, 1996, p. 8).  This perspective includes threats 
that originate from deliberate, accidental, and random causes. 
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If threats include deliberate, accidental, and random sources, then each of the 
following events could be a security-related compromise: 
• A terrorist attack that disables or destroys systems that support critical 
infrastructure; 
• Unauthorized modification of payroll data by a dishonest employee; 
• An accidental posting of personal information to a public web site in violation 
of privacy regulations; 
• A random hardware failure in a network security device that results in 
sensitive systems being exposed directly to the public Internet; 
• A weather-related electrical power failure that shuts down or damages vital 
systems. 
For the purposes of this study, the conceptualization of security effectiveness will 
include deliberate, accidental, and random threats. 
Types of IT assets requiring protection 
Straub (1986b, p. 27; 1990a, p. 47; 1990b, p. 257) and Kankanhalli et al. (2003, p. 
145) use the same scheme to describe IT assets that require protection, and this approach 
will be used in this study.  The four IT assets are: 
• Hardware:  Any IT asset that can be physically touched by a human, such as 
computers, printers, network devices, and portable media (e.g., diskettes).  
• Software:  An IT asset that provides instruction sequences to control actions 
performed by IT hardware. 
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• Data:  Data are an IT asset that consists of electronic representation of facts or 
knowledge. 
• Services:  A computer service is an IT asset that provides the capability to 
store, process, or transfer data.  IT hardware and software assets work together 
to provide IT services.  Examples of IT services include file and print 
capabilities, electronic mail, and Internet web access. 
The conceptualization of security effectiveness in this study includes the need to 
protect the four IT asset types (hardware, software, data, and services). 
Types of IT compromises 
An organization’s IT security policy states management’s position on acceptable 
and unacceptable uses of IT assets, thereby defining what constitutes a security 
compromise.  The Canadian government lists four types of IT compromises, including 
“replacement value” (the effective cost of replacing an asset if it were lost, damaged, or 
destroyed) as an asset sensitivity (A guide to risk assessment, 1996).  Since this is 
essentially a consequence of a loss of availability, it will not be discussed further in this 
paper.   
The realm of possible types of IT compromises can be grouped into a set of three 
different generic types of compromise (A guide to risk assessment, 1996): 
• Confidentiality:  Sensitivity to improper disclosure.  Unauthorized access to 
and copying of data are examples of compromise to confidentiality. 
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• Integrity:  Sensitivity to loss of accuracy or completeness.  Data corruption 
and unauthorized changes to services are examples of integrity compromises. 
• Availability:  Sensitivity to loss or disruption of access to IT assets.  
Deliberate interference with computer services and destruction of hardware 
are examples of compromise to availability. 
Kankanhalli et al. (2003) discusses various consequences of security 
compromises, such as financial losses and negative publicity.  However, that study does 
not clearly define different generic types of compromises.  For the purposes of this study, 
the conceptualization of security effectiveness will specifically include the need to 
protect against compromises of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
Types of safeguards 
The nature of the safeguards used to provide security must also be defined.  A 
number of typologies have been developed for categorizing different types of safeguards.  
A four-component set (physical, electronic, personnel, and policy safeguards) is capable 
of encompassing a variety of schemes.   Table 1 provides a comparison of the four 
safeguard types used in this study with other common typologies. 
The four safeguard types used in this study are defined here as: 
• Physical:   Safeguards such as locks, shields, fire suppression, and guards that 
provide protection for tangible IT assets. 
• Electronic:  Safeguards such as passwords, firewalls, and file access controls 
that restrict access to, or use of, data or services. 
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• Personnel:  Safeguards such as background checks, security awareness 
activities, and training that attempt to reduce threats from internal personnel. 
• Policy:  Safeguards such as security or operations policies, guidelines, 
standards, practices, and procedures that explain management’s position on 
acceptable and unacceptable uses of IT assets. 
 
 
 
Table 1  Comparison of safeguard typologies used in various studies 
Safeguard 
type 
(Straub, 1990a) 
equivalent 
term(s) 
(Straub, 1990b) 
equivalent 
term(s) 
Government of Canada 
equivalent term(s) (A 
guide to security risk 
management, 1996) 
Government of Canada 
equivalent term(s) (A 
guide to risk assessment, 
1996) 
Physical Physical Physical Non-technical: physical Physical and 
environmental, 
hardware 
Electronic Programmed Electronic Technical Hardware, software, 
communications, 
transmission, 
cryptographic, emission, 
network 
Personnel N/A N/A Non-technical: 
personnel 
Personnel 
Policy Administrative N/A Non-technical: 
procedural 
Administrative and 
organizational, 
operations 
 
 
 
 
While Kankanhalli et al. (2003) discusses various ways of classifying IT 
safeguarding practices, the authors do not explicitly define types of IT security 
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safeguards in their study.  For the purposes of this study, the conceptualization of security 
effectiveness will include the use of the four safeguard types presented here: physical, 
electronic, personnel, and policy. 
Conceptualization of IT security effectiveness 
Summarizing the above discussion of both academic and industry definitions, IT 
security effectiveness is conceptualized in this study as the extent to which security 
safeguards are perceived as successfully protecting IT-related hardware, software, data, 
and services from deliberate, accidental, or random threats to confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability. This includes physical, electronic, personnel, and policy measures.   
Additionally, Kankanhalli et al. (2003) examined overall preventive and deterrent 
effects of IT security safeguards in the study’s integrative model.  While not reflected in 
the definition of IT security effectiveness used here, these safeguard protection classes 
are also examined in this study to remain consistent with the model used by Kankanhalli 
et al. (2003).  Preventives and deterrents are further discussed in the following section, in 
context with other safeguard protection classes, such as detection, containment, and 
recovery. 
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Safeguard protection classes 
Safeguards can be classified based on the manner in which they support an 
organization’s security policy.  A safeguard may be invoked at one or more of several 
points in a potential or actual compromise scenario, depending upon whether the intent is 
to avert a compromise before it happens, identify or inhibit a compromise in progress, or 
deal with the results of a compromise, after the fact.  Physical, electronic, personnel, and 
policy safeguards can be implemented in variety of modes, depending upon the point in a 
compromise scenario at which it should be invoked.  Table 2 compares a number of 
protection classification schemes. 
 
 
 
Table 2  Comparison of safeguard classification schemes 
Safeguard 
protection 
class 
(Kankanhalli 
et al., 2003) 
equivalent 
terms 
(Straub, 
1990b) 
equivalent 
term(s) 
(Straub & 
Welke, 1998) 
equivalent 
term(s) 
Government of 
Canada 
equivalent 
term(s) (A guide 
to risk 
assessment, 
1996, p. 22) 
(Morton & 
Froh, 1996) 
equivalent 
term(s) 
 
Deterrence Deterrent 
measures 
Deterrent Deterrent Deterrence Threat 
motivation 
Prevention Preventive 
measures 
Preventive Prevention Prevention and 
avoidance 
Preventative 
 
Detection N/A N/A Detection Detection Detective 
Containment N/A N/A N/A Mitigative Containment 
Recovery N/A N/A Remedies Mitigative Recovery 
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The five safeguard classes outlined in Table 2 are capable of covering all 
components of the four classification systems shown in the table.  Extending the 
meanings used in previous research (Straub & Welke, 1998), these classes are defined as: 
• Deterrence:  These safeguards attempt to discourage deliberate attacks against 
a system through dissemination of information and threat of sanction.  This 
class includes components such as penalties for violations of security policies 
and security awareness training.  It can be argued that deterrent techniques are 
also useful in avoiding certain types of accidental threats, by educating 
personnel about the need for extra care and attention in security matters. 
• Prevention:  These safeguards impede security violations by actively 
enforcing aspects of the organization’s security policy.  Attempts to violate an 
aspect of policy enforced by a preventive safeguard are denied or inhibited by 
the safeguard itself.  This occurs regardless of whether the attempted violation 
is due to deliberate or accidental actions.  Door locks, file access controls, and 
passwords are examples of this class. 
• Detection:  Detection involves determining when a security violation has 
occurred.  This situation generally arises when the security policy (a deterrent) 
has been disregarded and safeguard mechanisms (a preventative) have been 
circumvented or overcome.  Detection is only useful if it triggers a response, 
so this definition can be extended by creating sub-classes of real-time and 
post-hoc detection techniques.  Real time detection techniques, such as 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and network monitoring are intended to 
  15
elicit rapid reactions to threats.  Post hoc detection techniques, such as 
security investigations, and suspicious activity reports are designed to “gather 
evidence of misuse and to identify perpetrators” (Straub & Welke, 1998, p. 
446).  These methods also provide information for post mortem analyses to 
aid in better management of future incidents. 
• Containment: These safeguards are intended to “limit the injury that would 
occur if a threat event is successful” (Morton & Froh, 1996, p. 191).  A 
containment safeguard is used to ensure that a partial compromise does not 
immediately imply a total compromise.  For example, the use of offsite 
backups ensures that a fire in one building does not cause the simultaneous 
destruction of data on both the main system and backup media. 
• Recovery:  Recovery safeguards involve follow-up actions after a successful 
threat event.  For deliberate threats, this can include punishment of offenders, 
through reprimands, termination, or legal action.  This can have the effect of 
recovering public confidence or recovering direct damages in a lawsuit.  
Recovery can also include any actions taken to restore the integrity or 
availability of IT assets (e.g., restoring lost or damaged files). 
Not all of these schemes presented in Table 2 consider the detection, containment, 
and recovery safeguard classes.  However, all address both deterrents and preventives as 
key aspects of security safeguarding.  These two classes have the benefit of rigorous 
investigation (Gopal & Sanders, 1997; Straub, 1986b), and a basis in general deterrence 
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theory2 (Straub, 1990b; Straub & Welke, 1998).  This study will specifically examine the 
use of deterrent and preventive class safeguards by assessing their perceived overall 
effectiveness (Appendix A, Q14 - Q17).  This is consistent with the integrative model 
used by Kankanhalli et al. (2003).  The examination of these safeguard classes does not 
alter the conceptualization of IT security effectiveness in this study, but provides an 
additional perspective of IS practitioners’ perceptions of the effectiveness of IT 
safeguards. 
IS Management Maturity: An Historical Overview 
The IS management maturity research construct has undergone several iterations 
and revisions over the past 30 years, as researchers grappled with its complex nature.  
Works of specific interest to this study include the following: 
• The initial suggestion of a staged progression in IS management maturity 
levels (Churchill, Kempster, & Uretsky, 1969); 
• Nolan’s (1973) original four-stage IS maturity model;  
• Gibson and Nolan’s (1974) refinement of the model;  
• Nolan’s (1979) second, six-stage model; 
• A series of criticisms of the stage model approach (Benbasat, Dexter, Drury, 
& Goldstein, 1984; Drury, 1983; King & Kraemer, 1984; Lucas & Sutton, 
1977); and  
 
2 Deterrence theory, part of the field of criminology, proposes that antisocial acts can be deterred through 
the application of compelling dissuasive measures and serious penalties for committing undesirable acts 
(Straub & Welke, 1998, p. 445). 
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• A set of alternative or refined approaches to modeling IS management 
sophistication (Auer & Ruohonen, 1997; Benbasat, Dexter, & Mantha, 1980; 
Farhoomand & Gatehouse, 1988; Galliers & Sutherland, 1991; Karimi, Gupta, 
& Somers, 1996; Sabherwal & Kirs, 1994). 
 
While the genesis of IS management maturity theory can be traced to earlier 
material (Churchill et al., 1969), Richard Nolan (1973) is generally credited with first 
expressing the notion that an organization’s IS management approach progresses through 
a series of four stages (Initiation, Contagion, Control, and Maturity).  Gibson and Nolan 
(1974) soon refined this model to further describe the processes that occur throughout 
each of the stages.  Nolan (1979) later expanded the model to include six stages 
(Initiation, Contagion, Control, Integration, Data Administration, and Maturity).  Both 
models used variations on IS budget growth as a predictor for IS management maturity.  
These models have been called “…among the best known ideas in MIS” (Drury, 1983, p. 
59), with the Gibson and Nolan (1974) work being one of the most cited articles in MIS 
research (Galliers & Sutherland, 1991). 
Despite the popularity of Nolan’s stage theory, critics have pointed out that: 
• The initial model was based on anecdotal data rather than scientific analysis, 
and IS budget alone is inadequate to predict maturity (Lucas & Sutton, 1977);  
• The models are an oversimplification, and do not accurately predict the erratic 
behaviour often exhibited by real organizations (Drury, 1983; King & 
Kraemer, 1984); 
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• Over time, an organization’s experience with IS becomes progressively less 
predictable and more idiosyncratic (Sullivan, 1985); 
• The models imply that maturity is a one-dimensional, monotonically 
increasing function (Benbasat et al., 1984; Sullivan, 1985); and 
• Technology dependencies in the models (e.g., database systems) can render 
them outdated for certain uses (Galliers & Sutherland, 1991; Sullivan, 1985). 
 
Nonetheless, most critiques also concluded that there was no evidence to clearly 
invalidate the general aspects of maturity theory.  Furthermore, the notion of IS 
management maturity finds acceptance in both the research and practitioner communities 
(Drury, 1983; Galliers & Sutherland, 1991; King & Kraemer, 1984).  One study provides 
an explanation for the appeal of this idea among practitioners: 
It is because it provides a conceptual language enabling an IS manager to identify 
where his/her firm is positioned in a “stages” sense.  This allows the manager to 
better grasp the current challenges facing the firm and the appropriate tactics for 
overcoming them, to predict what is likely to happen as the firm transcends to 
successive stages, and most importantly, to communicate these notions to other 
executives. (Benbasat & Zmud, 1999, p. 11) 
 
In response to the limitations of Nolan’s theory, alternate models for defining and 
measuring IS management maturity or sophistication have been proposed (Auer & 
Ruohonen, 1997; Farhoomand & Gatehouse, 1988; Galliers & Sutherland, 1991; 
Sabherwal & Kirs, 1994).  Related work in IS management maturity (Benbasat et al., 
1984; Benbasat et al., 1980) and technology assimilation (McFarlan, McKenney, & 
Pyburn, 1983), was later used by Karimi et al. (1996) to develop a multi-item, multi-
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dimension model to measure IS management maturity.  Where Nolan’s original work 
(1973) used three categories (planning, controlling, and organizing) to describe activities 
in the four maturity stages, a more recent model (Karimi et al., 1996, p. 64-65) uses the 
following four dimensions: 
• IT Planning Mode: Alignment of IT with the business, and use of managerial 
planning for improving the use of IT throughout the organization. 
• IT Control Mode: Use of a managerial orientation toward measuring IT value, 
basing controls on benefits, priorities, and standards. 
• IT Organization: Roles and responsibilities of users and IT personnel, and the 
level in the organization at which IT management resides. 
• IT Integration: Use of top down planning for IT, increased technology 
transfer, and greater exploitation of technology throughout the firm. 
 
The Karimi et al. (1996) model has been applied successfully in several recent 
studies that examine the maturity of an organization’s IS management function.  The first 
of these studies (Karimi et al., 1996), a survey of IT managers in the American financial 
services industry, examined the effect of IS management maturity factors (planning, 
control, organization, and integration) on a firm’s response to market globalization.  This 
study found that higher scores on the control, organization, and integration factors were 
associated with increased spending on IT in the context of international free trade 
agreements.  Another study (Gupta, Karimi, & Somers, 1997) looked at differences in IS 
management maturity factors based on a firm’s competitive strategy.  Using the Miles 
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and Snow (1978) framework of Prospectors, Analyzers, Defenders and Reactors, this 
study found that firms using different strategies tended to differ in their emphasis on the 
four maturity factors.  A third study (Karimi et al., 2000) investigated relations between 
the use of IT steering committees in organizations and IS management maturity factors.  
The authors found that the presence of IT steering committees correlated positively with 
higher levels of IS management maturity, and that that the type of steering committee 
predicted which of the maturity factors would dominate.  Finally, Karimi, Somers, and 
Gupta (2001) looked at differences in IS management maturity factors based on a firm’s 
customer service technology.  The results demonstrated that improvements in customer-
service can be related to increasing levels of the four IS management maturity factors. 
There are several reasons why the approach used by Karimi et al. (1996) is 
particularly suitable for measuring IS management maturity in the study described in this 
paper.  First, the model is simple and parsimonious, rendering it easy to explain, 
understand, and apply.  Second, it provides validated constructs that can be used for 
either longitudinal or cross-sectional comparisons.  Third, it comprises a multiple-item 
measurement that captures enough factors to provide a useful conceptualization of the 
notion of IS management maturity.  Fourth, the model is independent of technology-
specific constructs, and is therefore applicable regardless of the technology in use.  Fifth, 
the model inherently accounts for the need to address internal and external factors that 
can affect the IS management maturation process, by measuring variables that deal with 
goals, planning, and communication as these relate to internal and external actors.  Thus, 
this model has the flexibility to incorporate change, in terms of new strategies and 
planning requirements.  Finally, while implying that cycles of maturity (i.e., the four 
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phases) occur whenever new technologies are introduced, the model does not require a 
monotonic progression through those phases. 
One potential criticism of maturity models is the implication that there is one 
‘ideal’ level of maturity for all organizations, and therefore, a rigid notion of one ‘best’ 
way of managing IS for all possible situations.  However, the meaning of maturity in the 
Karimi et al. (1996) model reflects the extent to which IS is incorporated into the 
organization, and is able to effectively use resources to meet organizational requirements.  
Thus, the model’s flexibility is increased by emphasizing generic IS management 
activities, rather than implementation details that may vary from one organization to 
another.  This also maintains the model’s usefulness in cross-sectional analysis, since it is 
possible to make meaningful comparisons of the degree to which an IS group is involved 
within an organization, aware of the organization’s needs, and able to effectively use 
existing resources. 
Research Question and Hypothesis 
No research has been found that explores the relation between IS management 
maturity and IT security effectiveness.  The objective of this study is to examine how IS 
practitioners’ perceptions of IS management maturity relate to their perceptions of the 
effectiveness of IT security.  To do this, this study will test the following research 
hypothesis, as depicted in Figure 1: 
• H1: Perceived IS management maturity (measured by planning, control, 
organization, and integration components) positively correlates with perceived 
IT security effectiveness. 
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Figure 1.  IS management maturity and IT security effectiveness research model. 
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Method 
This study’s research question is examined with a quantitative methodology using 
a cross-sectional survey design.  The targeted population is English-speaking IS 
practitioners in Canada.  The sample frame is based on IS practitioners who were 
members of selected Canadian IS associations at the time of the study.  The survey was 
implemented as an Internet web site. 
The primary constructs of the survey, IT security effectiveness and IS 
management maturity, are based on Kankanhalli et al. (2003), for IT security,  and 
Karimi et al. (1996), for IS management maturity.  Components of the previously 
validated instruments of these researchers were reused to reinforce the validity of this 
study.  A series of pre-testing activities were undertaken to validate the survey instrument 
and the project was subjected to an ethics review prior to any contact with participants.  
Participants were solicited by way of their associations’ electronic mailing lists.  The 
following sections examine each of these matters in further detail. 
Population and Sample Design 
This study used an individual unit of analysis, which helped to improve sample 
size.  Additionally, substantial variations can exist within an organization (Sullivan, 
1985).  So, it is reasonable to assume that irregularities may also exist in IS management 
practices and IT security effectiveness across an organization’s IS infrastructure.  
Examining the perceptions of individuals improves the capture of such differences. 
Respondents had to be capable of answering questions about IS management and 
IT security.  Since increasing levels of computer literacy are associated with greater 
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awareness of IT security issues (Goodhue & Straub, 1991), end-users and other non-IS 
personnel are unlikely to respond well to security questions.  IS practitioners, though, are 
likely to be informed about, and influential concerning, both IS management practices 
and IT security safeguards.  Their perspective should provide useful insights on the 
subject (Goodhue & Straub, 1991).  IT security specialists, as a subset of the IS 
practitioner population, would be particularly well informed respondents.  However, this 
population is small in Canada.  Since the original source instruments were written in 
English, it was felt that respondents’ language of business should be the same.  English 
speaking, Canadian IS practitioners were therefore selected as the target population of 
this study.  This population does include a significant number of IT security specialists, 
which is in keeping with previous studies in this area (Goodhue & Straub, 1991; Straub, 
1990b). 
The population selected for this study is broader than that used by Karimi et al. 
(1996) to investigate the effects of IS management maturity on a firm’s response to 
market globalization.  Their survey was sent only to IT managers in the American 
financial services sector.  While the Kankanhalli et al. (2003) survey of IS security 
effectiveness did encompass a range of industries, it was still restricted to IS managers 
who belonged to an unnamed industry association.  By examining the perceptions of IS 
practitioners of various specializations across diverse industry segments, this study is able 
to capture a broader range of relevant perspectives.  The responses of a more 
heterogeneous population also provide a more demanding test of the research hypothesis, 
since surveying only managers, particularly if from a single industry, may reflect a 
narrower view of the issue. 
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Since IS is not a regulated profession in Canada, there is no known complete list 
of IS practitioners and no certain means of selecting a random sample of potential 
participants from this population.  The best available sample frame was considered to be 
the members of Canadian IS practitioner associations.  Therefore, a convenience sample 
was used, based on membership in one of two Canadian IS practitioner associations, 
yielding a sample frame of about 5,000 practitioners. 
Operationalization of Constructs 
IT security effectiveness 
Two approaches to operationalizing IT security effectiveness were found in the 
literature.  One of these approaches (Goodhue & Straub, 1991; Straub, 1989, 1990b) 
measures rates of security abuse, and has many advantages, including a rigorously 
validated instrument.  However, this approach has drawbacks.  First, the questionnaire 
used by Straub seeks potentially sensitive information, including the number of security 
incidents experienced in an organization and the corresponding dollar loss consequences.  
Loch et al. (1992) notes that these types of queries are likely to inflate non-response, 
despite the fact that Straub (1990b) reports respondent reluctance to answer these 
questions was not an issue in that study3.  Second, since many organizations do not 
maintain suitable records of actual security incidents, the measures are based on data that 
may not be accurately recorded (Kankanhalli et al., 2003).  Even where such records may 
exist, they may not be readily accessible to a large portion of the survey sample frame.  
 
3 Straub’s study achieved a 22% survey response rate. 
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This can lead to a variety of potential problems, including faulty recall and 
underreporting biases. 
To address concerns over confidentiality and level of analysis, this study employs 
an alternative approach to measuring IT security effectiveness.  Adapting earlier work 
(Straub, 1990b), Kankanhalli et al. (2003) employs a perceptual measurement to 
operationalize the sufficiency of IT security.  The measurement is a six-item scale that 
includes components relating to the perceived adequacy of protection for IT hardware, 
software, data, and services, as well as overall deterrent and preventive effects.  The 
reliability scores of these factors, as reported by Kankanhalli et al. (2003), are provided in 
Table 3.  Based on pre-testing results, an expanded set of eight items (Appendix A, Q10 - 
Q17) was used to operationalize this construct.   The items are summarized as follows: 
• Protection of hardware:  A single item measuring perceived effectiveness of 
security safeguards for IT related hardware. 
• Protection of software:  A single item measuring perceived effectiveness of 
security safeguards for IT related software. 
• Protection of data:  A single item measuring perceived effectiveness of 
security safeguards for electronic data. 
• Protection of computer services:  A single item measuring perceived 
effectiveness of security safeguards for computer services. 
• Overall deterrent effect: The single item used to measure the perceived 
effectiveness of disincentives against deviant acts was split into two parallel 
items measuring deterrence separately for insiders and outsiders. 
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• Overall preventive effect:  The single item used to measure the perceived 
effectiveness of preventive countermeasures was split into two parallel items 
measuring prevention separately for insiders and outsiders. 
 
 
 
Table 3  Factor scores (Kankanhalli et al., 2003) 
IT security 
effectiveness 
variable 
Hardware 
protection 
Software 
protection 
Data 
protection 
Services 
protection 
Deterrent 
effect 
Preventive 
effect 
Reliability .88 .80 .85 .83 .77 .75 
 
 
IS management maturity 
IS management maturity was operationalized by adapting the Karimi et al. (1996) 
20-item instrument for measuring IS planning, control, organization, and integration.  
Table 4 provides reliability scores for these multi-item factors as reported in the Karimi et 
al. study.  All factors presented Cronbach’s Alpha scores of over .70, which is generally 
considered the minimum acceptable lower limit (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998, 
p. 118).  An adapted set of 21 items (Appendix A, Q41 – Q46, Q34 – Q39, Q28 – Q32, 
Q23 – Q26) was used in this study’s survey.  The following subsections provide 
descriptions of the four maturity factors. 
 
Table 4  Factor reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) scores (Karimi et al., 1996) 
IS maturity variable Planning Control Organization Integration 
Reliability .88 .86 .80 .78 
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Planning 
Six items measure respondent’s perceptions of the planning component of 
maturity.  These items were designed to capture the extent to which the organization has 
been able to “align IT plans with … business plans and to extend the infusion and 
diffusion of IT…” (Karimi et al., 1996, p. 64).  These items are presented in Section 3D 
of the survey instrument (Appendix A, Q41 – Q46). 
Control 
Six items measure respondent’s perceptions of the control component of maturity.  
These items were designed to assess the organization’s use of “controls … based on 
benefits, priorities (selective charge-out) and technical standards and the organizational 
goals …” (Karimi et al., 1996, p. 64).  These items are presented in Section 3C of the 
survey instrument (Appendix A, Q34 – Q39). 
Organization 
Karimi et al. (1996) used four items to measure respondent’s perceptions of the 
organization component of maturity.  A fifth item (Appendix A, Q28) was added to this 
study’s instrument after pre-test results demonstrated a potential response concern.  (This 
item is discussed further in the later section on Instrument Development.)  These items 
were designed to assess the degree to which the structure of the IS group fits with 
organizational needs and how well it is able to capture and process ideas.  This is 
especially important with respect to the ideas of end-users, which require “special 
attention in the planning and implementation of applications” (Karimi et al., 1996, p. 64).  
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These items are presented in Section 3B of the survey instrument (Appendix A, Q28 – 
Q32). 
Integration 
Four items measure respondent’s perceptions of the integration component of 
maturity.  These items were designed to determine the organization’s ability to link IS 
strategy to business needs, transfer technology to applications, and effectively exploit IT 
(Karimi et al., 1996, p. 65).  These items are presented in Section 3A of the survey 
instrument (Appendix A, Q23 – Q26). 
Implementation 
The 21 items comprising the four dimensions of IS management maturity, and the 
8 items measuring IT security effectiveness, were all implemented using a five-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  This same 
implementation was used by Karimi et al. (1996) for the IS management maturity items.  
However, the IT security items, as originally implemented by Kankanhalli et al. (2003), 
used a seven-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree).  The security questions were therefore adapted to a five-point Likert scale to 
present a more consistent appearance to survey respondents.  These two constructs 
provided a prevalidated set of measures for the independent and dependent variables 
under consideration. 
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Instrument Development 
The survey was implemented as a web site, which was felt to be consistent with 
the characteristics of the targeted respondents.  It can reasonably be assumed that this 
group has experience in computer-related technologies, so novelty effects of a web-based 
instrument were not seen as significant. This approach also permitted measurement of 
individuals’ perceptions from a large, geographically dispersed sample frame in a short 
period of time, while controlling costs. 
Following procedures recommended by Dillman (2000), several stages of pre-
testing were undertaken before the survey was released.  These are presented in the 
following subsections. 
Stage one 
Dillman (2000) suggests beginning the instrument pre-testing process with 
reviews by knowledgeable colleagues.  The project research committee served in this 
capacity, thoroughly reviewing the instrument and refining it several times before 
proceeding to the next stage of pre-testing. 
Stage two 
Using a combination of Dillman’s (2000) Concurrent Think-Aloud Protocol and 
Retrospective Interview techniques, the instrument was pre-tested in a paper form with 
four different IS practitioners.  The individuals involved ranged in experience from a 
junior technical level to a senior managerial position.  Thus, it was possible to estimate 
how practitioners of different seniority levels might respond to the questions.  Wordings 
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were changed to reduce ambiguity in several items as a result of difficulties noted by the 
pre-test subjects.  Additionally, the two security effectiveness items concerning 
deterrence and prevention were split into four items so that an insider/outsider4 
dichotomy could be included.  Finally, one additional item (Appendix A, Q28) was added 
to the organization factor of IS management maturity to capture the extent to which the 
ideas of IT personnel are included in IT planning and implementation.  The original 
questions and their adapted versions are presented in Table 5 through Table 10. 
 
 
4 Pre-testing indicated that field practitioners often distinguish between safeguarding against “insider” and 
“outsider” based compromises.  Insiders are generally considered to be persons who are known to the 
organization and therefore have first-hand knowledge of the organization’s operations.  Outsiders do not 
generally have such information readily available to them.  
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Table 5  Comparison of IT security effectiveness items 
Item from Kankanhalli et al. (2003) Adapted item 
The computer security effort is very effective 
in protecting the following from abuse: 
 
 
Hardware 
 
 
At your primary place of work, current Information 
Security measures provide effective protection for IS 
hardware: 
 
Software 
 
 
At your primary place of work, current Information 
Security measures provide effective protection for IS 
software: 
 
Data 
 
 
At your primary place of work, current Information 
Security measures provide effective protection for 
electronic data: 
 
Computer services 
 
 
At your primary place of work, current Information 
Security measures provide effective protection for 
the services provided by information systems (e.g. 
file, print, email services): 
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Table 6  Comparison of IT security safeguard protection class items 
Item from Kankanhalli et al. (2003) Adapted item 
The computer security effort is very effective 
in protecting the following from abuse: 
 
 
At your primary place of work, current Information 
Security measures are effective in deterring security 
violations by insiders (i.e. discouraging 
known/internal people from attempting to breach 
the organization’s security measures): 
 
Overall deterrent effect 
 
At your primary place of work, current Information 
Security measures are effective in deterring security 
violations by outsiders (i.e. discouraging 
unknown/external people from attempting to 
breach the organization’s security measures): 
 
At your primary place of work, current Information 
Security measures are effective in preventing 
security violations by insiders (i.e. stopping attempts 
by known/internal people from actually breaching 
the organization’s security measures): 
 
Overall preventive effect 
 
At your primary place of work, current Information 
Security measures are effective in preventing 
security violations by outsiders (i.e. stopping 
attempts by unknown/external people from actually 
breaching the organization’s security measures): 
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Table 7  Comparison of planning maturity items 
Item from Karimi et al. (1996) Adapted item 
 
Our IT projects support the business 
objectives and strategies of our company. 
 
At your primary place of work, the IT projects 
support the organization’s business objectives and 
strategies. 
 
We continuously examine the innovative 
opportunities IT can provide for competitive 
advantage. 
 
At your primary place of work, the organization 
regularly examines the innovative opportunities that 
IT can provide for competitive advantage. 
 
We are adequately informed on the current 
use of IT by competitive forces (e.g., buyers, 
suppliers, and competitors) in our industry. 
 
At your primary place of work, the organization is 
adequately informed about the current use of IT by 
competitive forces (e.g. buyers, suppliers, and 
competitors) in its industry. 
 
We are adequately informed on the potential 
use of IT by competitive forces (e.g. buyers, 
suppliers, and competitors) in our industry. 
 
At your primary place of work, the organization is 
adequately informed about the potential use of IT by 
competitive forces (e.g. buyers, suppliers, and 
competitors) in its industry. 
 
We have an adequate picture of the coverage 
and quality of our IT systems. 
 
At your primary place of work, the organization has 
adequate information about the capabilities and 
quality of its IT systems. 
 
We are content with how our IT project 
priorities are set. 
 
At your primary place of work, the organization is 
satisfied with how its IT project priorities are set. 
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Table 8  Comparison of control maturity items 
Item from Karimi et al. (1996) Adapted item 
 
In our organization, the responsibility and 
authority for IT direction and development are 
clear. 
 
At your primary place of work, the overall 
responsibility and authority for IT direction and 
development are clear. 
 
In our organization, the responsibility and 
authority for IT operations are clear. 
 
At your primary place of work, the overall 
responsibility and authority for IT operations are 
clear. 
 
We are confident that IT project proposals are 
properly appraised. 
 
At your primary place of work, IT project proposals 
are properly appraised. 
 
We constantly monitor the performance of IT 
functions. 
 
At your primary place of work, the organization 
regularly monitors the performance of its IT 
functions. 
 
Our IT function is clear about its goals and 
responsibilities. 
 
At your primary place of work, the IT group is clear 
about its goals and responsibilities. 
 
Our IT function is clear about its performance 
criteria. 
 
At your primary place of work, the IT group is clear 
about its performance criteria. 
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Table 9  Comparison of organization maturity items 
Item from Karimi et al. (1996) Adapted item 
 
N/A 
 
At your primary place of work, the ideas of IT 
personnel are given due attention in IT planning and 
implementation. 
 
In our organization, user ideas are given due 
attention in IT planning and implementation. 
 
At your primary place of work, end user ideas are 
given due attention in IT planning and 
implementation. 
 
Our IT specialist understands our business and 
the firm. 
 
At your primary place of work, the IT personnel 
understand the business and the organization. 
 
The structure of our IT function fits our 
organization. 
 
At your primary place of work, the structure of the 
IT group fits the organization. 
 
The IT specialist-user relations in our firm are 
constructive. 
 
At your primary place of work, relations between IT 
personnel and end users are constructive. 
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Table 10  Comparison of integration maturity items 
Item from Karimi et al. (1996) Adapted item 
 
In my firm top management perceives that 
future exploitation of IT is of strategic 
importance. 
 
At your primary place of work, top management 
perceives that future use of IT is of strategic 
importance. 
 
There is a top-down planning process for 
linking information systems strategy to 
business needs. 
 
At your primary place of work, there is a top-down 
planning process for linking IT strategy to business 
needs. 
 
Some IT development resource is positioned 
within the business unit. 
 
At your primary place of work, some IT 
development resources are positioned within 
individual business units/functional 
areas/departments. 
 
The introduction of, or experimentation with, 
new technologies takes place at the business 
unit level under business control. 
 
At your primary place of work, the introduction of, 
or experimentation with, new technologies takes 
place at the business unit/functional area/department 
level under business unit/functional area/department 
control. 
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Stage three 
Dillman (2000) recommends that a pilot study be undertaken at this point, to 
validate the procedures that are intended to be used in the main study.  Due to time and 
sample restrictions, a full pilot study was not feasible.  In its place, two rounds of 
additional pre-testing were performed once the instrument had been implemented in its 
electronic format.  In the first round, the protocol used in stage two pre-testing was used 
to observe two participants responding to the survey questions in their electronic format.  
Based on the results of this round, the instrument was modified to improve the visibility 
of instructions, highlighting of keywords, and ease of navigation through the questions.  
In the second round of this stage, three additional IS practitioners responded to the 
electronic pre-test questionnaire, having only been provided with instructions via 
electronic mail messages.  This closely emulated the procedure that was later used with 
respondents to the main study.  No significant procedural problems were detected. 
Stage four 
Dillman (2000) suggests a final check, performed by people who have not been 
involved in the questionnaire development up to that point.  This is considered important, 
since “People who have worked on one revision after another soon lose their ability to 
detect obvious problems” (Dillman, 2000, p. 147).  A walk-through of the entire process 
was performed with one person, who had not been directly involved in the questionnaire 
development.  No significant concerns were raised during this procedure. 
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Procedure 
Research ethics approval 
Prior to engaging any participants in this study, application was made to The 
Faculty of Management Research and Ethics Committee at The University of Lethbridge.  
This committee reviewed the proposed research design to ensure conformance to 
acceptable ethical guidelines and standards as described in the Tri-Council Policy 
Statement for the ethical conduct of research involving humans.  Approval was granted 
before any contact was made with the study participants. 
Solicitation of participants 
Executive members from four different Canadian IS practitioner organizations 
were approached to determine if they would be willing to facilitate access to their 
membership for participation in this study.  Two organizations did not respond and two 
agreed to send the solicitation notices to their members via electronic mailing lists.  
Citing privacy concerns, neither of the participating organizations would permit direct 
access to their membership lists. 
The first of the two participating groups (Association ‘A’) is a large, national 
body of IS practitioners.  This organization represents both IS generalists and a wide 
range of IS specialists from several provinces across Canada.  Only those registered as 
English-speaking members from this group were contacted.  A biweekly electronic 
newsletter was the only means of contact with members of this organization. 
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The second organization (Association ‘B’) is a smaller group of IS practitioners 
from a large Western Canadian city.  This group consists primarily of practitioners whose 
focus is IT security and privacy matters.  Solicitation notices were sent to this 
organization via an electronic mailing list and were timed to coincide with the notices 
sent to members of Association ‘A.’ 
To bring attention to the study, a pre-notice was sent to both associations 
approximately two weeks before the survey web site was made available.  Association 
‘B’ published this pre-notice to their members, but Association ‘A’ did not.  Additionally, 
approximately one week prior to the pre-notice, the executive of Association ‘B’ openly 
endorsed the survey during a regular meeting of the organization’s membership.  Once 
the survey web site became available, both associations published an announcement to 
their membership.  Two weeks later, both associations also published a follow-up notice 
to their membership via the same electronic mail medium used for the pre-notice and 
announcement.  The survey notices and announcement are presented in Appendix B.  
Approximately two weeks after the follow-up notices were published, the web site was 
closed and the database moved to a secure location for analysis. 
Two actions were taken to help attract participants.  First, those who completed 
the survey were given the opportunity to request a copy of the study’s results.  Second, 
participants could also optionally choose to participate in a draw for one of four $50 gift 
certificates from a popular retailer of office supplies and business technology.  While 
there is some debate about the effectiveness of such measures, these two techniques are 
commonly used as survey participation incentives (Ilieva, Baron, & Healey, 2002). 
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Results 
Association ‘A’ reported that approximately 5,000 people across Canada were 
registered to receive the English version of its electronic newsletter.  The association also 
reported that approximately 17% of its members were students who would be unlikely 
(and arguably, unqualified) to respond to this survey.  Thus, the overall sample frame, 
once unqualified respondents were removed, totaled approximately 4,150 potential 
participants.   However, only 32 responses were received from this organization.  Due to 
missing data (i.e. skipped questions or answers of ‘not sure’ – see section entitled 
Missing data for more details) 10 responses were removed, leaving just 22 useable 
responses.  Individuals could not be contacted directly, so a precise response rate cannot 
be calculated, but this response is approximately 0.77%, with 0.53% being useable. 
Web-based surveys are known to risk low response, with rates being up to 80% 
lower than their paper equivalents (Morrel-Samuels, 2003).  However, this response is 
very low by any standard, suggesting that either distribution or readership may not be 
accurately reflected in the newsletter registration figure.  In a conversation that took place 
a few months after the survey was complete, one member of this association mentioned 
that it was not uncommon for members to ignore the association’s electronic newsletter 
as a means of dealing with time constraints and information overload.  Thus, the effective 
sample frame size may have been very much smaller than originally anticipated.  In any 
case, it seems unlikely that a lack of interest alone would account for the low response, 
since this association is known to have several, well-attended Special Interest Groups 
(SIGs) that focus primarily on IT security topics.  Rather, one or more of several factors, 
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discussed in the following paragraph, may have negatively affected response from 
Association ‘A.’ 
The low response from Association ‘A’ may be partially attributable to a pre-
notice not being published as planned in the association’s newsletter, due to the 
unexpected pre-announcement of another, unrelated survey on IT security.  Members of 
Association ‘A’ may have confused the two pre-notices, and since the one for this project 
was the second to appear, many people may simply have ignored it.  Lack of a pre-notice 
and limited response windows have been suggested as factors that can negatively affect 
response to web surveys (Ilieva et al., 2002).  Time constraints permitted the survey web 
site to be active for only four weeks, so lack of a pre-notice could have delayed some 
responses beyond the time available for participation.  Also, discussions with a second 
member of Association ‘A’ indicated that its newsletters frequently contain survey 
solicitations, so members may have succumbed to survey fatigue.  This has been noted as 
a serious problem for response rates in web-based questionnaires (Couper, 2000).  
Finally, timing may be a major factor in the lack of response.  It was necessary to 
perform data gathering activities during the summer, which has been suggested as a 
period during which response to electronic mail survey notifications can be seriously 
affected (Ilieva et al., 2002). 
Association ‘B’ reported that the invitation to participate in the survey was 
distributed via their email list, and was sent to 325 people throughout Western Canada.  
A total of 66 responses were received from this organization.  Due to missing data (i.e. 
skipped questions or answers of ‘not sure’ – see section entitled Missing data for more 
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details), 20 responses were removed, leaving 46 useable responses.  This yielded a 
useable response rate of approximately 20%. 
The higher response rate from Association ‘B’ is likely due to five factors.  First, 
the primary focus of this group is IT security and privacy.  Second, this group had not 
taken part in such surveys in the past, so survey fatigue is likely to be much less of an 
issue.  Third, the association’s executive actively endorsed the survey.  Fourth, a survey 
pre-notice was sent to the members of this group.  Finally, a brief presentation was made 
during one of the association’s meetings to encourage participation. 
Overall, response to this survey was considerably less than anticipated.  Because 
of the low response rate and the use of a convenience sample, there are difficulties in 
generalizing the results to the broader population.  Consequently, tests for response biases 
were not considered practical.  Those who did participate, however, generally provided 
complete responses, often including detailed comments to explain their choices.  These 
participants obviously took significant time to consider their responses and ensure that 
they were clearly understood.  Thus, what is lacking in the quantity of data is somewhat 
offset by the high quality of the information obtained. 
Participant Profile 
Demographic results describing the personal attributes of survey respondents are 
presented in Table 11 and Table 12.  Male respondents may be over-represented (79.4%), 
but the proportion is not completely out of step with gender ratios found in other IS 
studies.  For example, one study at a large utility in the Eastern United States reported 
that women comprised 29.4% of the IS development staff (Igbaria & Baroudi, 1995). 
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Table 11  Personal demographics of respondents 
Overall Assoc. ‘A’ Assoc. ‘B’ Demographic Variable 
Count % Count % Count % 
Gender 
 Male 
 Female 
 
54 
14 
 
79.4 
20.6 
 
14 
8 
 
63.6 
36.4 
 
40 
6 
 
87.0 
13.0 
 Total 68 100.0 22 100.0 46 100.0 
Age 
 Under 20 
 20 to 24 
 25 to 29 
 30 to 34 
 35 to 39 
 40 to 44 
 45 to 49 
 50 to 54 
 55 to 59 
 60 or over  
 
0 
0 
5 
13 
7 
11 
13 
12 
5 
1 
 
0.0 
0.0 
7.4 
19.1 
10.3 
16.2 
19.1 
17.6 
7.4 
1.5 
 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
4 
5 
4 
5 
1 
 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
9.1 
0.0 
18.2 
22.7 
18.2 
22.7 
4.5 
 
0 
0 
5 
11 
7 
7 
8 
8 
0 
0 
 
0.0 
0.0 
10.9 
23.9 
15.2 
15.2 
17.4 
17.4 
0.0 
0.0 
 Missing data 1 1.4 1 4.6 0 0 
 Total 68 100.0 22 100.0 46 100.0 
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Table 12  Educational demographics of respondents 
Overall Assoc. ‘A’ Assoc. ‘B’ Demographic Variable 
Count % Count % Count % 
Education (highest level) 
 Some high school 
 Completed high school 
 Completed certificate 
 Some college 
 Completed college 
 Some university 
 Completed university 
 Some graduate work 
 Completed graduate work 
 Other 
 
0 
3 
8 
4 
7 
13 
15 
4 
14 
0 
 
0.0 
4.4 
11.8 
5.9 
10.3 
19.1 
22.1 
5.9 
20.6 
0.0 
 
0 
0 
1 
2 
3 
5 
5 
1 
5 
0 
 
0.0 
0.0 
4.5 
9.1 
13.6 
22.7 
22.7 
4.5 
22.7 
0.0 
 
0 
3 
7 
2 
4 
8 
10 
3 
9 
0 
 
0.0 
6.5 
15.2 
4.3 
8.7 
17.4 
21.7 
6.5 
19.6 
0.0 
 Total 68 100.0 22 100.0 46 100.0 
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The median age group was 40 to 44 years, with a range from the 25 to 29 years 
category, to the 60 years or over category.  The sample was bimodal and contains a large 
number of respondents in the 30 to 34 years category and in the 45 to 49 years category.  
The recent emergence of security and privacy as a major specialty field within IS may 
explain the higher than expected frequency in the younger of these two categories.  The 
emphasis on managerial aspects would likely cause practitioners from even younger 
categories to be less likely (and arguably less qualified, on average) to participate.  The 
large number of respondents in the 45 to 49 years category likely reflects participation 
from more senior managers, who have found themselves responsible for overseeing IT 
security efforts. 
The educational background of respondents was assessed using ten categories 
from “Some high school” to “Completed graduate work” (see Table 12).  The majority of 
respondents (approximately two-thirds) reported at least some university education at the 
undergraduate level or higher.  Over 25% of the sample indicated experience at the 
graduate level.  Thus, the sample contains a range of educational backgrounds, with a 
tendency toward the higher end of the scale. 
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Demographic results concerning the professional attributes of the participants are 
presented in Table 13 and Table 14.  The average respondent was an employee of the 
organization he/she considered as his/her primary place of work, had worked there for 
just under seven years, and spent slightly less than half of that time (M = 3.0 years) in 
his/her most recent position.  The median career position was at a supervisor level with 
over half of the sample reporting either security/privacy or management as their primary 
area of expertise.  On average, participants reported spending just less than half of their 
time on IT security matters at work. 
While IT security is a significant part of the participants’ work concerns, there is 
diversity in the perspectives reflected in the sample.  Additionally, the number of 
participants reporting a high level of education, substantial work experience, or 
management level responsibilities indicates that the sample does tap into a population 
that should be able to respond effectively to questions about managerial topics.  It is 
reasonable to conclude from this data that the respondents, on average, are well qualified 
to address the types of questions posed in the survey. 
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Table 13  Professional demographics of respondents 
Demographic variable 
 (refers to primary place of work) 
Count % M SD 
Tenure at primary place of work   6.8 years 6.9 
Tenure in current/most recent position   3.0 years 2.4 
Employment type 
 Self employed 
 Contracting/consulting firm 
 Full or part time employee 
 
7 
15 
46 
 
10.3 
22.1 
67.6 
  
 Total 68 100.0   
Position type 
 Technical 
 Supervisor 
 Management 
 Executive/senior management 
 Other 
 
26 
19 
12 
10 
1 
 
38.2 
27.9 
17.6 
14.7 
1.5 
  
 Total 68 100.0   
Primary area of IS expertise 
 Technology 
 Applications 
 Database 
 Security/Privacy 
 Management 
 Other 
 
17 
7 
4 
27 
10 
2 
 
25.0 
10.3 
5.9 
39.7 
14.7 
2.9 
  
 Missing data 1 1.5   
 Total 68 100.0   
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Table 14  IT security demographics of respondents 
Demographic variable 
 (refers to primary place of work) 
Count % M SD 
Percentage of time spent on IT security   44.9 38.5 
Number of IT security credentials held 
 0 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 
44 
17 
5 
2 
 
64.7 
25.0 
7.4 
2.9 
  
 Total 68 100.0   
 
 
 
 
Comparison of Demographic Data of Participating Associations 
Professional demographic data for Association ‘A’ and Association ‘B’ are 
broken out into Table 15 through Table 18, to permit comparisons between the two 
subgroups.  While there are some differences in the intra-group demographics, none of 
these differences is surprising, given the stated goals of the two associations. 
Members of Association ‘A’ reported slightly longer tenures at their primary 
places of work and most recent positions.  Both groups reported similar employment type 
and position type characteristics.  However, Association ‘B’ members did show a 
considerably higher weighting on Security/Privacy as their primary area of expertise.  
This result is not unexpected, as this group’s main focus is security and privacy topics.  
Similarly, Association ‘B’ members also reported a higher average amount of time spent 
on IT security and a higher tendency to hold IT security-related credentials. 
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Table 15  Professional demographics of Association 'A' respondents 
Demographic variable 
 (refers to primary place of work) 
Count % M SD 
Tenure at primary place of work   7.7 years 6.8 
Tenure in current/most recent position   3.2 years 2.4 
Employment type 
 Self employed 
 Contracting/consulting firm 
 Full or part time employee 
 
2 
5 
15 
 
9.1 
22.7 
68.2 
  
 Total 22 100.0   
Position type 
 Technical 
 Supervisor 
 Management 
 Executive/senior management 
 Other 
 
8 
8 
3 
3 
0 
 
36.4 
36.4 
13.6 
13.6 
0.0 
  
 Total 22 100.0   
Primary area of IS expertise 
 Technology 
 Applications 
 Database 
 Security/privacy 
 Management 
 Other 
 
5 
6 
3 
3 
5 
0 
 
22.7 
27.3 
13.6 
13.6 
22.7 
0.0 
  
 Total 22 100.0   
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Table 16  IT security demographics of Association ‘A’ respondents 
Demographic variable 
 (refers to primary place of work) 
Count % M SD 
Percentage of time spent on IT security   35.5 40.4 
Number of IT security credentials held 
 0 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 
19 
2 
0 
1 
 
86.4 
9.1 
0.0 
4.5 
  
 Total 22 100.0   
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Table 17  Professional demographics of Association ‘B’ respondents 
Demographic variable 
 (refers to primary place of work) 
Count % M SD 
Tenure at primary place of work   6.4 7.0 
Tenure in current/most recent position   2.9 2.5 
Employment type 
 Self employed 
 Contracting/consulting firm 
 Full or part time employee 
 
5 
10 
31 
 
10.9 
21.7 
67.4 
  
 Total 46 100.0   
Position type 
 Technical 
 Supervisor 
 Management 
 Executive/senior management 
 Other 
 
18 
11 
9 
7 
1 
 
39.1 
23.9 
19.6 
15.2 
2.2 
  
 Total 46 100.0   
Primary area of IS expertise 
 Technology 
 Applications 
 Database 
 Security/Privacy 
 Management 
 Other 
 
12 
1 
1 
24 
5 
2 
 
26.1 
2.2 
2.2 
52.2 
10.9 
4.3 
  
 Missing data 1 2.1   
 Total 46 100.0   
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Table 18  IT security demographics of Association 'B' respondents 
Demographic variable 
 (refers to primary place of work) 
Count % M SD 
Percent of time spent on IT security   49.3 37.2 
Number of IT security credentials held 
 0 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 
25 
15 
5 
1 
 
54.3 
32.6 
10.9 
2.2 
  
 Total 46 100.0   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Preparation 
Missing data 
The questionnaire permitted respondents to skip questions, or answer “not sure” if 
they did not feel able to answer adequately.  These instances were dealt with as missing 
data.  Participants not providing valid responses for at least 50% of the items in each of 
the key constructs (planning, control, organization, integration, and IT security 
effectiveness) were dropped from further analysis.  In the remaining 68 records, there 
were 26 missing values distributed as shown in Table 19.  The total number of values in 
the key constructs data set, once unusable records were removed, was 1,972 (68 records x 
29 observations per record).  Thus, the missing values represent only 1.3% of the usable 
  54
data set.  The item means of valid responses were used to calculate replacement values 
for missing items, in accordance with the procedure recommended by Hair et al. (1998). 
 
 
Table 19  Missing data values by construct 
Construct/Construct Factor Count of Missing Data Values  
Planning 8 
Control 3 
Organization 3 
Integration 6 
IT security effectiveness 6 
Total 26 
 
 
 
Combining data sets 
Due to the size of the sample obtained in this study, it was important to be able to 
combine the data obtained from both Association ‘A’ and Association ‘B’ into one data 
set for analysis.  A MANOVA test was used to compare item response means for the 
independent and dependent variables of planning, control, organization, integration, and 
IT security effectiveness.  Pillai’s Trace criterion, a conservative statistic that is robust 
under conditions of small sample size and possible unequal cell sizes (Hair et al., 1998), 
was used to assess the omnibus model.  At an alpha level of .05, no significant 
differences in responses between the two groups were found, F (5,62) = 0.856, p = 0.516.  
The data from the two associations were then analyzed as a single data set. 
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Research Model Analysis 
Partial least squares 
Analysis of the data was performed using Partial Least Squares (PLS), as 
implemented in PLS-Graph.  This approach to Structured Equation Modeling (SEM) is 
consistent with that used by the original authors of the IT security effectiveness construct 
(Kankanhalli et al., 2003).  While constructs used in this study were previously validated, 
the theoretical basis for the study is in the early stages of development.  PLS is generally 
better suited to this type of theory development than other techniques, such as LISREL 
(Barclay, Higgins, & Thompson, 1995).  PLS does not require a specific underlying data 
distribution or multivariate homogeneity (Chin, 1998).  It is also robust in the context of 
small samples (Barclay et al., 1995).  Finally, PLS permits the simultaneous evaluation of 
both structural and measurement models. 
Initial model 
The initial (untrimmed) PLS model is presented in Figure 2.  All constructs, 
including the nested model for IS management maturity, were configured using the more 
conservative mode A (reflective) indicators, as described by Chin (1998).  Mode B 
(formative) maximizes the explained variance of the latent variables (Chin, 1998), and it 
was felt that this might risk overstating the results.  Sample size and multicollinearity 
within blocks can affect the stability of PLS results, and this difficulty is minimized when 
reflective mode indicators are used (Chin, 1998).  The use of reflective indicators is also 
consistent with the approach used by Kankanhalli et al. (2003) in that study’s analysis of 
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the IT security effectiveness construct.  Finally, for both latent constructs, responses to 
the perceptual questions in the instrument do not give rise to the constructs, or indicate 
the presence of precursors to their existence.  Rather, responses to the questions reflect 
perceptions of consequences of the constructs, indicating that a mode A model is 
appropriate (Barclay et al., 1995). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Initial PLS model 
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The initial factor structures for the independent variable are presented in Table 20, 
and those for the dependent variable are provided in Table 21.  To ensure convergent and 
discriminant validity, items were examined for adequate loadings on their respective 
constructs, and low cross-loadings on all others.  The generally accepted minimum 
loading on an intended construct is .707 (Chin, 1998). 
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Table 20  Initial factor structures (independent variable) 
 Item 
Latent 
variable 
for 
planning 
Latent 
variable 
for 
control 
Latent variable 
for 
organization 
Latent 
variable for 
integration 
Latent 
variable 
for 
security 
Planning      
Q41, IT supports business  .62 .64 .59 .07 .34 
Q42, Examine IT innovation .80 .54 .62 .32 .29 
Q43, Inform current IT .85 .43 .58 .40 .29 
Q44, Inform potential IT .81 .34 .55 .34 .09 
Q45, Org. informed about IT .70 .58 .54 .16 .39 
Q46, IT project priorities  .60 .42 .55 .22 .11 
Control      
Q34, IT direction authority .56 .84 .57 .25 .58 
Q35, IT operations authority .44 .77 .57 .18 .49 
Q36, IT proposals appraised .45 .78 .43 .11 .40 
Q37, IT performance .56 .79 .43 .34 .46 
Q38, Clear IT goals .60 .86 .60 .31 .55 
Q39, Clear IT performance .59 .86 .48 .31 .48 
Organization      
Q28, Ideas of IT personnel .54 .38 .76 .28 .21 
Q29, Ideas of end users .56 .37 .85 .26 .24 
Q30, IT knows business .60 .42 .71 .10 .47 
Q31, IT group structure .60 .64 .74 .19 .50 
Q32, End user relations .65 .60 .75 .21 .37 
Integration      
Q23, IT is strategic .36 .32 .39 .74 .09 
Q24, Top down planning .34 .46 .37 .52 .27 
Q25, IT in business units .17 .13 .03 .75 .02 
Q26, New IT introduction .16 .05 .05 .76 -.06 
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For the independent variable, the maturity items were examined for their loadings 
on the four latent constructs of maturity.  Factor loadings for planning, control, 
organization, and integration are provided in Table 20.  Due to poor loadings and cross-
loadings, items one and six of the planning construct were dropped from further analysis 
(Q41, Q46).  These items may be flawed, in that they presume the existence of clearly 
communicated business objectives, strategies, and IT project priorities.  This may be a 
faulty assumption in organizations with low planning sophistication.  Without items one 
and six, item five (Q45) yielded an unacceptable factor loading of .65.  Item five of the 
planning construct was therefore dropped as well, as it appears to tap into control issues 
of measuring the capabilities and quality of IT systems. 
 
 
Table 21  Initial factor structures (dependent variable) 
Item 
Latent 
variable 
for 
planning 
Latent 
variable 
for control 
Latent variable 
for 
organization 
Latent 
variable for 
integration 
Latent 
variable for 
security 
Q10, Security of hardware .31 .55 .33 .02 .83 
Q11, Security of software .28 .53 .33 .00 .86 
Q12, Security of data .30 .56 .41 .04 .91 
Q13, Security of services .22 .46 .44 -.01 .85 
Q14, Deter insiders .27 .51 .34 .08 .78 
Q15, Prevent insiders .37 .43 .44 .26 .73 
Q16, Deter outsiders  .17 .44 .34 .06 .76 
Q17, Prevent outsiders .28 .45 .39 .18 .80 
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Item two of the integration construct (Q24) loaded poorly in the context of the 
other three items.  When this item was removed, problems were encountered with the 
stability of the construct.  No stable configuration of the items could be created using 
PLS, possibly due to bi-dimensionality.  Items one and two of the integration construct 
(Q23, Q24) seem to be more closely related to planning or management support for IS.  
Items three and four may simply be unreliable, as they were also removed in another 
study that used this construct (Karimi et al., 2000).  As a result, the integration construct 
was removed from further analysis. 
For the dependent variable, initial factor structures are presented in Table 21.  All 
items loaded well onto the security effectiveness latent construct, with values well over 
the minimum of 0.707.  No problematic cross-loadings were found.  All eight items of IT 
security effectiveness were kept. 
Trimmed model 
The trimmed PLS model is presented in Figure 3 and the trimmed factor 
structures are shown in Table 22.  All items can be seen to load adequately on their 
intended factors, with comparatively low cross-loadings.  This trimmed model was used 
for all further analysis. 
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Figure 3.  Trimmed PLS model 
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Table 22  Trimmed factor structures 
 Item 
Latent variable 
for planning 
Latent variable for 
control 
Latent variable for 
organization 
Latent variable 
for security 
Planning     
Q42, Examine IT innovation .83 .54 .62 .29 
Q43, Inform current IT .92 .43 .58 .29 
Q44, Inform potential IT .91 .34 .55 .09 
Control     
Q34, IT direction authority .45 .84 .57 .58 
Q35, IT operations authority .27 .77 .57 .49 
Q36, IT proposals appraised .27 .78 .43 .40 
Q37, IT performance .43 .79 .43 .46 
Q38, Clear IT goals .49 .86 .60 .55 
Q39, Clear IT performance .48 .86 .48 .48 
Organization     
Q28, Ideas of IT personnel .49 .38 .76 .21 
Q29, Ideas of end users .50 .37 .85 .24 
Q30, IT knows business .49 .42 .71 .47 
Q31, IT group structure .48 .64 .74 .50 
Q32, End user relations .56 .60 .75 .37 
Security effectiveness     
Q10, Security of hardware .23 .55 .33 .83 
Q11, Security of software .17 .53 .33 .86 
Q12, Security of data .20 .56 .41 .91 
Q13, Security of services .09 .46 .44 .85 
Q14, Deter insiders .23 .51 .34 .78 
Q15, Prevent insiders .35 .43 .44 .73 
Q16, Deter outsiders  .14 .44 .34 .76 
Q17, Prevent outsiders .25 .45 .39 .80 
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Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for all items retained in the trimmed model are presented in 
Table 23.  The 22 retained items in the trimmed model were all implemented using a 
five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  The 
means range from 3.23 (Q44) to 4.03 (Q17).  The standard deviations range from 0.83 
(Q43 and Q28) to 1.25 (Q14).  Floor effects in these results therefore seem unlikely.  
Ceiling effects do not seem to pose a significant problem either, although some of the 
items related to IT security effectiveness do show high mean values and large standard 
deviations that approach the top end of the measurement (Q10, Q12, and Q17). 
Descriptive statistics for the combined item scores of each of the constructs are 
presented in Table 24.  On average, respondents agreed somewhat with the IS 
management maturity survey statements for planning (M = 3.37), control (M = 3.47), and 
organization questions (M = 3.69).  The overall average for all IS management maturity 
items5 (M = 3.53) indicates that the participants agreed somewhat with the IS 
management maturity questions, as a whole.  However, more than 20% of participants 
disagreed with questions 34 (IT direction authority, 26.5%), 37 (IT performance, 20.6%), 
39 (Clear IT performance, 20.6%), 44 (Inform potential IT, 22.1%), and 46 (IT project 
priorities, 20.6%)6.  Three of these were control questions (Q34, Q37, and Q39) and two 
were planning questions (Q44 and Q46), suggesting that some of the respondents see 
weaknesses in these aspects of IS management. 
 
5 The overall average for IS management maturity items is an unweighted mean of the means of the three 
retained IS management maturity measures (planning, control, and organization). 
6 Due to space limitation the frequencies of the various items have not been included, but can be obtained 
from the author. 
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Table 23  Descriptive statistics of trimmed model items 
Item M SD 
Planning   
Q42, Examine IT innovation 3.45  1.01  
Q43, Inform current IT 3.42  0.83  
Q44, Inform potential IT 3.23  0.88  
Control   
Q34, IT direction authority 3.40  1.01  
Q35, IT operations authority 3.75  0.97  
Q36, IT proposals appraised 3.30  0.93  
Q37, IT performance 3.52  0.97  
Q38, Clear IT goals 3.57  0.95  
Q39, Clear IT performance 3.31  1.00  
Organization   
Q28, Ideas of IT personnel 3.75  0.83  
Q29, Ideas of end users 3.64  0.87  
Q30, IT knows business 3.60  0.90  
Q31, IT group structure 3.62  0.96  
Q32, End user relations 3.84  0.84  
IT security effectiveness   
Q10, Security of hardware 3.91  1.02  
Q11, Security of software 3.65  1.09  
Q12, Security of data 3.69  1.07  
Q13, Security of services 3.76  1.05  
Q14, Deter insiders 3.47  1.25  
Q15, Prevent insiders 3.90  0.98  
Q16, Deter outsiders  3.39  1.15  
Q17, Prevent outsiders 4.03  0.90  
Note.  All items were scored on a five-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
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Table 24  Descriptive statistics of combined item scores (trimmed model) 
Construct M SD 
Planning 3.37 0.91 
Control 3.47 0.98 
Organization 3.69 0.88 
IS management maturity 3.53 0.94 
IT security effectiveness 3.72 1.08 
Note.  All items were scored on a five-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
 
 
 
Practitioners were also in agreement, on average, with the IT security 
effectiveness questions (see Table 23).  The lowest average response was for the item 
measuring perceived effectiveness of preventing attacks by insiders (M = 3.39).  The 
highest average response was for the item measuring perceived effectiveness of 
preventing attacks by outsiders (M = 4.03).  The overall mean response for IT security 
effectiveness items (M = 3.72) indicates that respondents, on average, agreed with the IT 
security effectiveness questions in the context of their respective organizations (see Table 
24).  However, more than 20% of participants disagreed with questions 14 (Deter 
insiders, 23.5%), and 15 (Prevent insiders, 28%), suggesting that some of these 
practitioners see weaknesses in these aspects of IT security. 
Analysis and interpretation of PLS model 
The following presents the analysis and interpretation of the PLS model.  Barclay 
et al. (1995, p. 295) suggests performing this in two stages.  First, the measurement 
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model is evaluated for reliability and validity.  Then, the structural model is evaluated for 
significance and substantiveness. 
The measurement model assesses the association between each construct and the 
items used to measure it.  To perform this analysis, Barclay et al. (1995) recommends 
examining the reliability of individual items, internal consistency, and discriminant 
validity. 
The factor scores of the individual items are shown in Table 22.  Loadings are 
correlations (Barclay et al., 1995), and should therefore exceed .707 on the intended 
construct, as an indication of less than 50% (.7072 = .499) unexplained variance (i.e. 
noise component) in the item.  Convergent validity is thus demonstrated by each item 
sharing greater than 50% of its variance with the intended construct.  All of the retained 
measures in the trimmed model clearly met this criterion.  Loadings for the nested model 
are presented in Table 25.  Again, it is clear that the nested latent variables and items 
retained in the trimmed model load well onto the intended constructs. 
Internal consistency and convergent validity are assessed here using the Fornell 
and Larcker (1981) equation, and Average Variance Extracted (AVE), respectively.   The 
Fornell and Larcker measurement is similar to the more commonly used Cronbach’s 
Alpha and is interpreted in much the same manner, so the accepted minimum for this 
measure is .70 (Barclay et al., 1995).  However, the Fornell and Larcker calculation is 
considered superior and is more widely accepted amongst researchers using PLS (Barclay 
et al., 1995).  Both of the key constructs (IS management maturity and IT security 
effectiveness) and the lower order model constructs for IS management maturity 
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(planning, control, and organization) exceeded the cutoff for internal consistency, as 
shown in Table 26. 
 
 
 
Table 25  Factor loadings of nested model 
Latent variable or item 
Latent variable for IS 
management maturity 
Latent variable for IT security 
effectiveness 
Latent variable for planning 0.75 0.25 
Latent variable for control 0.89 0.60 
Latent variable for organization 0.89 0.46 
Q10, Security of hardware 0.48 0.83 
Q11, Security of software 0.46 0.86 
Q12, Security of data 0.51 0.91 
Q13, Security of services 0.44 0.85 
Q14, Deter insiders 0.46 0.78 
Q15, Prevent insiders  0.48 0.73 
Q16, Deter outsiders 0.40 0.76 
Q17, Prevent outsiders 0.45 0.80 
 
 
 
 
AVE gauges the shared variance of a construct and the items used to measure it 
(Barclay et al., 1995), as compared to the variance due to measurement error (Chin, 
1998).  Essentially, this is the degree to which the construct items tap into the same 
underlying construct (Kankanhalli et al., 2003).  AVE should exceed .50, indicating that 
at least 50% of the variance of the indicators can be explained (Chin, 1998).   The results 
presented in Table 26 indicate an adequate level of convergent validity in the two key 
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constructs (IS management maturity and IT security effectiveness) and the lower order 
model constructs for IS management maturity (planning, control, and organization). 
 
 
 
 
Table 26  Internal consistency and convergent validity of constructs 
Construct Internal consistency7 Average Variance Extracted8
Planning .92 .78 
Control .92 .67 
Organization .87 .58 
IS management maturity .88 .71 
IT security effectiveness .94 .67 
 
 
 
 
Discriminant validity, the extent to which measures of a construct maintain low 
correlations with other constructs, is an indication of the uniqueness of a construct 
(Barclay et al., 1995).  Chin (1998), states that an indication of acceptable discriminant 
validity is when the square root of AVE exceeds the correlations between constructs.  As 
is shown in Table 27, the nested model used here meets this criterion. 
                                                 
7 Fornell and Larcker’s measure of internal consistency is (Barclay et al., 1995, p. 306): ( )
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∑
+ ελ
λ
iyi
yi
Var2
2
 where yiλ  is the component loading and  ( ) 21 yiiVar λε −=
 
8 The formula for Average Variance Extracted (AVE) is (Barclay et al., 1995, p. 306): 
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A second condition for acceptable discriminant validity is to have all items load 
highest on the construct they are intended to measure (Barclay et al., 1995).  Since any 
items that cross-loaded too strongly were removed in the trimmed model, this criterion is 
satisfied.  (Table 22 provides the trimmed factor structures.)  Additionally, the latent 
variables within the nested model also fulfill this discriminant validity condition, as 
presented in Table 25. 
 
 
 
 
Table 27  Discriminant validity of constructs 
Construct IS management maturity IT security effectiveness 
IS management maturity .85  
IT security effectiveness .57 .82 
Note.  Diagonal elements in bold are square roots of AVE.  The off-diagonal element 
is the correlation between the constructs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Once the validity and reliability of the measurement model were confirmed, 
analysis of the structural model was undertaken to assess the relation between the 
constructs.  Evaluation of the structural model was performed by examining the 
predictive power of the model, as well as the path coefficient and its statistical 
significance.  A summary of the results is presented in Table 28 and the structural model 
results are shown in Figure 4. 
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Table 28  Structural model results 
Path 
Standardized path 
coefficient 
t-Value for 
path 
 
H1: IS management maturity  -->  IT security effectiveness 
 
.57 
 
7.69*** 
Note. *** p < .001 
  R2 for IT security Effectiveness = .32 
 
 
 
 
 
The structural model was able to account for 32% of the variance in the 
endogenous construct (see Figure 4).  The jackknifing procedure (Chin, 1998) was used 
to calculate the t-statistic for the path coefficient.  IS management maturity was positively 
associated with IT security effectiveness, t = 7.69, p < .001.  H1 was supported. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  PLS structural model results 
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Barclay et al. (1995) suggests that any model with greater than 25%  explained 
variance has merit.  The original authors of the IT security effectiveness construct used 
here (Kankanhalli et al., 2003) note that others have suggested a 10% cutoff for 
establishing substantive explanatory power.  In either case, the results obtained in this 
study clearly meet the suggested criterion. 
Comparing the results obtained in this study to others that used similar constructs, 
or examined issues in the same general research area, can also provide insights to the 
substantiveness of this study’s findings.  Kankanhalli et al. (2003) reported that the model 
used in that study was able to explain 18.7% of the variance in IT security effectiveness.  
The study used three independent variables (organizational size, top management 
support, and industry type) and three mediating variables (deterrent efforts, deterrent 
severity, and preventive efforts) to predict IT security effectiveness.  An earlier study by 
Goodhue and Straub (1991) achieved 5% explained variance by using industry risk, 
company actions, and individual awareness to predict the security concern level of end 
users.  Finally, a third study (Straub, 1990b) used IT security deterrents and preventive 
measures to predict rates of system abuse, and reported explained variance levels 
between 24.2% and 37.4%. 
These comparative results suggest that the explanatory power of this study’s 
model is substantive and that the perceived maturity of an organization’s IS management 
practices positively correlates with the perceived effectiveness of its IT security 
safeguards. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
This study examined the relation between IS practitioners’ perceptions of IS 
management maturity and their perceptions of IT security effectiveness.  IS management 
maturity, an expression of the sophistication of an organization’s IS management 
practices, was assessed with perceptual measures for planning, control, organization, and 
integration, based on prior work by Karimi et al. (1996).  IT security effectiveness was 
assessed with measurements for the perceived effectiveness of protection provided by 
safeguards for hardware, software, data, and services as well as overall deterrent and 
preventive effects.  The IT security measures were based on prior work by Kankanhalli et 
al. (2003). 
A cross-sectional web-based survey of English-speaking IS practitioners in 
Canada was performed.  The sample frame consisted of IS practitioners who were 
members of two selected Canadian IS associations at the time of the study.  The number 
of usable responses was lower than anticipated (N = 68), but this was still adequate for 
analysis using Partial Least Squares (PLS). 
Findings 
This study’s findings show a positive correlation between the participants’ 
perceptions of IS management maturity (the exogenous construct) and their perceptions 
of IT security effectiveness (the endogenous construct).  The path coefficient of the PLS 
structural model (.57) was shown to be statistically significant (t = 7.69, p < .001) and the 
structural model was able to account for 32% of the variance in the endogenous 
construct.  Barclay et al. (1995) suggests that any PLS model with greater than 25%  
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explained variance has merit.  Overall the hypothesis that perceived maturity in IS 
management practices is positively associated with perceived IT security effectiveness 
was supported (path coefficient = .57). 
IT security effectiveness 
The mean response overall for IT security effectiveness items (M = 3.72) implies 
agreement with the survey questions (see Table 24).  That is, on average, respondents 
indicated that they viewed IT security safeguards within their organizations as effective.  
Furthermore, the results show a consistency in this perception across the different types 
of IT assets.  From the highest of these means, for security of hardware (M = 3.91), to the 
lowest, security of software (M = 3.65), the average responses were consistently in 
agreement with the survey questions (see Table 23).  The mean responses varied slightly 
more for the items pertaining to the effectiveness of different safeguard classes.  
Nonetheless, from the highest of these, effectiveness of preventive measures against 
outsiders (M = 4.03), to the lowest, effectiveness of preventive measures against insiders 
(M = 3.39), respondents still agreed, on average, with the survey questions.  Thus, on the 
whole, these respondents indicated a perception of effectiveness in IT security 
safeguards.   
However, it is worth noting that more than 20% of participants disagreed with 
questions 14 (Deter insiders, 23.5%), and 15 (Prevent insiders, 28%), suggesting that 
some of these practitioners see weaknesses in these aspects of IT security.  Preventing 
violations by insiders can be problematic.  Dishonest insiders may have legitimate access 
to the IS assets of concern (Courtney, 1977), and may therefore be aware of potential 
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vulnerabilities in existing security mechanisms.  Insiders are also more likely to engage in 
abusive behaviour (Hoffer & Straub, 1989). 
The fact that the practitioners who took part in this survey seem to be indicating 
that they believe IT security safeguards are, on average, effective, seems to contradict 
other recent surveys (Power, 2002; Richardson, 2003).  It is possible that Canadian 
practitioners perceive a lower threat level than is perceived in other geographic areas.  A 
recent study, co-sponsored by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, noted that few 
Canadian corporate executives “see their organizations as being at significant risk of 
attack” (Kapica, 2003).  A lower perceived threat level could have the effect of causing 
IT security safeguards to appear more effective, on average, in a Canadian context.  
Alternatively, reporting on the problem may be flawed.  As an example, a recent poll 
asked CEOs from mid-size Canadian companies to rate the effectiveness of IT security 
safeguards within their organizations, using a three-point scale of very effective, 
somewhat effective or somewhat ineffective (Ferneyhough, 2002).  The poll somewhat 
alarmingly reported that only 30% of the CEOs considered IT security safeguards to be 
“very effective” (Ferneyhough, 2002, p. 2).  However, this statement may be misleading.  
An examination of the detailed tables shows that almost two thirds (approximately 62%) 
of the respondents considered IT security safeguards to be “somewhat effective” 
(Ferneyhough, 2002).  So, the finding that the majority of that poll’s respondents 
(approximately 92%) perceived at least some effectiveness in their existing IT security 
safeguards seems to be more in line with this study’s findings. 
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IS management maturity 
Results for IS management maturity echoed those for IT security.  The overall 
mean for all maturity items (M = 3.53) implies that the respondents agreed somewhat 
with the survey questions.  Thus, the participants seem to perceive an adequate level of IS 
management maturity in their organizations.  As with the IT security effectiveness 
measurements, there is consistency in these results.  The mean responses for planning (M 
= 3.37), control (M = 3.47), and organization (M = 3.69) all demonstrate agreement with 
the survey questions.  The following sections discuss ways in which the components of 
IS management maturity (planning, control, organization, and integration) may contribute 
to the effectiveness of IT security. 
Planning 
This component is concerned with alignment of IT with the business and use of 
managerial planning for improving the use of IT throughout the organization (Karimi et 
al., 1996).  See Table 7 for a comparison of the original questions used by Karimi et al. 
(1996), and the adapted questions used in this study.  Items one and six of the planning 
construct (Appendix A, Q41, Q46) were dropped from analysis.  These items seem to 
presume the existence of clearly communicated business objectives, strategies, and IT 
project priorities, which may be a faulty assumption, especially in organizations with low 
planning sophistication.  Item five (Appendix A, Q45) of the planning construct appears 
to tap into control issues concerning measurement of the capabilities and quality of IT 
systems, and was also removed.  The remaining items were found to be valid and reliable 
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in the context of IS security, which is a new context from that in which these measures 
were originally developed by Karimi et al. (1996). 
While respondents, on average, agreed with the survey questions for planning (M 
= 3.37), more than 20% of participants disagreed with questions 44 (Inform potential IT, 
22.1%), and 46 (IT project priorities, 20.6%).  This suggests that some participants see 
weaknesses in their respective organizations’ practices concerning planning for future use 
of IT, and setting priorities for IT projects. 
It can be argued that many short-term security efforts are reactions to failures in 
longer-term planning activities.  For example, the need to investigate a security incident 
may be due to a breakdown in safeguards that should have been designed to prevent the 
problem.  Maturity in IS planning practices would therefore seem to be likely to benefit 
IT security. 
Control 
This component is concerned with the use of a managerial orientation toward 
measuring IT value, basing controls on benefits, priorities, and standards (Karimi et al., 
1996).  See Table 8 for a comparison of the original questions used by Karimi et al. 
(1996), and the adapted questions used in this study.  All of the control maturity items 
were found to be valid and reliable in the context of IS security. 
While respondents, on average, agreed with the survey questions for control (M = 
3.47), more than 20% of participants disagreed with questions 34 (IT direction authority, 
26.5%), 37 (IT performance, 20.6%), and 39 (Clear IT performance, 20.6%).  This 
suggests that some participants see weaknesses in their respective organizations’ control 
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practices concerning assignment of overall authority and responsibility for IT, regular 
monitoring of IT performance, and clear performance criteria for the IT group. 
Security has traditionally been implemented using control mode approaches based 
on policies, guidelines, standards, and practices.  Auditors, historically a part of 
organizational management control structures, have, with varying degrees of success, 
made extensive use of policies and guidelines as frameworks to substantiate their 
opinions on IT security as an internal control matter (COBIT: Control objectives, 2000).  
IT security safeguards are sometimes even referred to as “controls” (COBIT: Control 
objectives, 2000; ISO/IEC 17799:2000, 2000).  The connotation is that safeguards 
provide management with a means of controlling the use of IS by monitoring its use and 
restricting the functionality of the related systems and services.  Recent work continues to 
emphasize the use of control mode management techniques for IT security, such as 
improvements in security metrics (Christie & Goldman, 2003).  It follows that 
organizations with mature managerial practices for control of overall IS functions are 
likely well prepared to implement effective control measures related to IT security. 
Organization 
This component of maturity concerns the roles and responsibilities of users and IT 
personnel, and the level in the organization at which IT management resides.  See Table 9 
for a comparison of the original questions used by Karimi et al. (1996), and the adapted 
questions used in this study.  All of the control maturity items were found to be valid and 
reliable in the context of IS security. 
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Respondents, on average, agreed with the survey questions for control (M = 3.69).  
Furthermore, there were no items with which more than 20% of participants disagreed.  
This suggests that participants did not perceive areas of particular weakness in the 
organization practices of their respective organizations. 
The need to address organizational factors is emphasized in IT security practice 
literatures.  For example, in a recent article the authors note the need to consider 
“complex organizational dynamics, such as vertical industry, operational models, 
company location, user distribution, and corporate financial health” (Briney & Prince, 
2002, p.36) as key factors in IT security decision-making processes.  The international 
standard Code of Practice for Information Security Management (ISO/IEC 17799:2000, 
2000) dedicates an entire chapter to organizational security, emphasizing the need for 
specifying roles, responsibilities, information flows, and organizational entities.  It would 
seem to follow that more mature IS organization structures are not only better suited to 
supporting general organizational requirements, but are also more likely to have success 
implementing and maintaining effective security practices. 
Integration 
Integration refers to the use of top down planning for IT, increased technology 
transfer, and greater exploitation of technology throughout the firm (Karimi et al., 1996). 
The items used to assess IS integration (Appendix A, Q23, Q24, Q25, Q26), although 
based on previous research (Karimi et al., 1996), had to be removed from the analysis due 
to stability problems in the measurement.  No combination of two or more items from 
this study’s data produced a usable result.  In later research using this construct, Karimi et 
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al. (2000) removed two of the four integration items that related to experimentation with, 
or development of, IT capabilities at the business unit level (equivalent to Appendix A, 
Q25, Q26).  These items may simply be unreliable.  The other two items (Appendix A, 
Q23, Q24) concern the perception of IT as a strategic resource and the presence of a top-
down planning process for IT.  On post hoc examination, these items appear to be tapping 
into a construct that might be better identified as managerial support or advocacy for IS, 
as implemented by other researchers (Aladwani, 2002; Igbaria & Baroudi, 1995; Yoon, 
Guimaraes, & O'Neal, 1995).  Further work appears to be necessary to develop a more 
robust measurement for this dimension of IS management maturity. 
Conclusions 
Using previously validated measurements for IS management maturity (Karimi et 
al., 1996) and IT security effectiveness (Kankanhalli et al., 2003), this study found a 
strong, positive correlation between the participants’ perceptions of IS management 
maturity and IT security effectiveness.  Thus, this study provides evidence that 
organizational factors in addition to those examined by Kankanhalli (2003) may 
influence the effectiveness of IT security safeguards.  IS practitioners, the participants in 
this study, are likely to be informed about, and influential concerning, both IS 
management and IT security.  As such, their perspectives on these subjects are useful 
(Goodhue & Straub, 1991), and are believed to generally reflect practices in place within 
their respective organizations. 
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This study did not address how IS management maturity might relate to the 
organizational and mediating variables of the integrative model used by Kankanhalli et 
al. (2003).  Further investigation would therefore be required to assess how this study’s 
findings might be used to augment those of Kankanhalli et al. (2003).  However, the 
results of this study do imply that the organizational variable, IS management maturity, 
may also be a positive contributor to the effectiveness of an organization’s IT security 
efforts. 
As an organization’s IS practices mature, the additional attention paid to IS by 
management may contribute to improvements in the organization’s ability to cope with 
the complexities of IT security.  Also, mature IS management practices may be more 
likely to allocate the necessary resources to meet the demanding nature of effective IT 
safeguarding.  While the methodology used in this study cannot demonstrate causation, it 
seems possible that the organizational changes associated with increased IS management 
maturity are beneficial to the effectiveness of IT security efforts.  Specifically, increasing 
levels of sophistication in IS management planning, control, and organization activities 
may play an important role in improving IT security safeguarding. 
Contributions 
This study is one of the first to examine IS management maturity in the context of 
IT security and found a strong, positive correlation between the participants’ perceptions 
of IS management maturity and IT security effectiveness.  The notion of maturity has 
been applied to security in other ways (Siponen, 2002; Stacey, 1996; SSE-CMM, 2003).  
Previous studies have also examined specific managerial variables in the context of IT 
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security, including top management support (Kankanhalli et al., 2003), MIS executive 
concerns (Loch et al., 1992), disciplinary response to computer abuse (Straub, 1990a, 
1990b), and allocation of organizational resources (Goodhue & Straub, 1991; Straub, 
1990b).  No prior research has been found that empirically tested a model of IS 
management maturity in the context of IT security.  This study has therefore provided a 
new and useful perspective on the matter of protecting IT assets. 
A complex, multi-dimensional construct was used to measure perceived IS 
management maturity, avoiding problems inherent in the use of simpler models.  The 
management maturity measurements developed by Karimi et al. (1996) generally held in 
the new context of IS security, but this study did encounter problems applying some of 
the measures for integration and planning maturity.  The original authors of these 
measurements (Karimi et al., 1996) experienced similar difficulties (Karimi et al., 2000), 
suggesting that additional work is required to produce stable items.  The study described 
here also successfully refined the items originally used by Karimi et al. (1996) (see Table 
7 to Table 10), and added an item to the organization component of IS maturity (the 
influence of IT personnel on IT planning and implementation, see Appendix A, Q28). 
This investigation successfully refined the IT security effectiveness measurement 
introduced by Kankanhalli et al. (2003).  Use of the insider/outsider dichotomy for the 
deterrent and preventive measures provided additional insight into how practitioners 
perceive the effectiveness of these approaches in different threat contexts.  These 
refinements can be of significant value to practitioners and researchers in understanding 
the effect of different safeguarding modes, and in the development of security plans or 
architectures. 
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Finally, this study provides further information in a very under-researched area.  
As noted by Dhillon (2003), there is both a lack of research into IT security and an acute 
need for better understanding of IT security matters, due to threats from both insiders and 
outsiders.  The strong relation found here between perceived IS management maturity 
and perceived IT security effectiveness provides a clear indication of an important part of 
successful IT safeguarding.  Furthermore, the design of this study permitted an 
investigation of various aspects of both security and maturity, providing valuable insights 
into factors that help to explain effectiveness of security in IT.  Ultimately, the results of 
this study yield an important perspective on how IS practitioners perceive the influence 
that management can have on the protection of valuable organizational resources. 
Limitations of This Study 
The primary limitation of this study is the low response rate.  IS practitioners are a 
difficult population to access in Canada, since the profession is not regulated nationally 
or in any province.  Consequently, there is no simple means of identifying, enumerating, 
assessing, or contacting this population, as a whole.  This made it impractical to ascertain 
the extent to which the professional associations that comprised the sample frame in this 
study actually reflect the broader population.   Nonetheless, the associations that 
participated in this study are felt to have been the best sample frame available at the time. 
Because there was no means of directly contacting potential participants, there 
exists the possibility of a self-selection bias amongst respondents to the solicitation 
notices.  Moreover, the low response rate by Association ‘A’ raises some concern about 
the degree to which the sample is representative of the sample frame.  However, the 
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demographics of the respondents indicate that they were appropriate for the study, and 
that a range of perspectives is reflected in the data.  Additionally, the strong results and 
reasonable item variances (see Table 23) demonstrate that coherent responses were 
acquired from this sample.  Although variance was probably lost with the small sample 
size, the relationship between IS management maturity and IT security effectiveness was 
significant.  While caution is appropriate in the interpretation of these results, they are 
consistent with both theory and practice and do not present any serious explanatory 
difficulties. 
Additional limitations of this research include the use of a very new measurement 
for IT security effectiveness, the application of maturity in a new context, and the lack of 
a causal explanation for the findings.  Strong factor loadings and high reliability were 
achieved with the IT security effectiveness measurement, and the results are consistent 
with those reported by Kankanhalli et al. (2003).  This alleviates much of the concern 
related to the use of this new measurement.  Similarly, the results achieved with the IS 
management maturity construct suggest that the measurement was used successfully in 
the new context of IT security.  The parallel difficulties with the integration and planning 
constructs reported here and by Karimi et al. (2000), further imply that this measurement 
was suitably implemented in this study.  Finally, it is a limitation of the research 
methodology that causality cannot be conclusively determined.  This is therefore left as 
an avenue for future research. 
In view of the limitations just mentioned, there are constraints on this study’s 
external validity.  That is, the sample obtained in this study’s survey may not be 
representative of the population of IS practitioners.  For example, this study’s survey may 
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have tended to attract more highly motivated respondents, who may, in turn, tend to 
reflect more mature organizations.  Additionally, the IS practitioner associations used in 
this study’s sample frame may tend to attract a non-representative subset of the 
population of IS practitioners.  Accordingly, care should be used when generalizing these 
results to the entire population of IS practitioners.  But, this research maintains its 
usefulness for academics, in the development of further research hypotheses, and for 
practitioners, as a model for adaptation to specific situations. 
Finally, the survey was designed to be simple and easy to complete for 
respondents.  There exists the possibility that this may have introduced a methods bias 
that influenced respondents to over or under state their true perceptions.  Additionally, it 
is possible that participants may have simply attempted to provide consistent responses 
throughout the survey, causing a response bias.  Such biases may reduce the internal 
validity of the results obtained in this study.  Additionally, measuring the perceptions of 
IS practitioners, rather than alternatives, such as rates of security abuse (Goodhue & 
Straub, 1991), may have introduced perceptual biases into the data.  Nonetheless, these 
perceptual measurements have been used before by other researchers (Kankanhalli et al., 
2003; Karimi et al., 1996) who validated their psychometric properties and reported 
similar results to those obtained in this study. 
Directions for Future Research 
Clearly, the first direction that future research in this area should take is to 
replicate this study with additional samples.  In other geographic areas it may be practical 
to establish better sample frames.  Also, practitioners from other regions may indicate a 
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different level of concern for the effectiveness of IT security safeguards.  Beyond this, 
further work could seek to understand how the different components of maturity relate to 
security effectiveness or examine in detail the mechanisms that underlie how 
improvements in maturity can influence IT security.  Experimental research could 
facilitate an understanding of the causal links underlying this study’s findings.  
Alternatively, a longitudinal analysis of the variables used in this study would shed some 
light on which components of maturity may be of greater or lesser interest at different 
points in the evolution of an organization’s IS management practices. 
Despite the substantive explained variance achieved in this study (see Table 28, 
Figure 4) other variables must also be influential in terms of an organization’s IT security 
effectiveness.  Organizational culture and reliance on IS are suggested by Kankanhalli et 
al. (2003), along with various deterrent and preventive measures.  Research that extended 
the analysis beyond deterrent and preventive measures, to include detection9, 
containment, and recovery protection classes (see Table 2) would provide a more useful 
set of security capability design options for practitioners.  The possibility of 
preconditions, such as the legal environment or social norms may also be of important 
predictive value. 
More work is needed to develop an IS management maturity measurement that is 
robust in the context of IT security.  Considering the experience of this study, and that of 
Karimi et al. (2000), improvements in the integration measures should be the first 
priority, followed by a refinement of the items used to measure planning.  Progress in 
these areas would likely improve the predictive value of this study’s model and permit 
 
9 Detection is specifically mentioned by Straub (1986b) as an avenue for extending this analysis. 
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future investigations to examine possible relations between integration maturity and 
security effectiveness. 
Implications for Practice 
In general, as systems increase in technical complexity, corresponding 
improvements in management techniques are required (Drury, 1983).  The results 
obtained in this study suggest that there is a positive association between IS practitioners’ 
perceptions of an organization’s IS management maturity level, and the organization’s 
capacity to deal with the complexities of IT security.  Practitioners should therefore 
consider how this might affect the selection of IT security safeguards.  The 
implementation of advanced security technologies, for instance, may be of limited value 
if the organization cannot adequately manage its existing systems.  One author states that 
IS managers who install Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) may not obtain the level of 
protection they are seeking if they do not already have a thorough understanding of the 
organization’s current systems (McQuillan, 2002).  This problem may be exacerbated if 
managers or end users refuse to accept new safeguards because they are, or appear to be, 
too sophisticated to be meaningful within the organizational setting (Dhillon & 
Backhouse, 1996).  In these situations, security practitioners might do better to 
concentrate on improving management processes for existing systems, rather than 
acquiring additional, complex equipment.  This is not to say that appropriate security 
tools are not necessary, only that the organization must be prepared to adapt to the 
complexities of each tool it adopts.  As an organization’s IS management practices 
increase in sophistication, more complex IT security safeguards may become likely to 
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provide effective protection.  Organizations would therefore do well to consider the 
maturity of their management practices when selecting IT security safeguards. 
An important distinction should be made at this point.  This study is not 
suggesting that practitioners should attempt to make their organizations more mature 
through some artificial technique, nor is it suggesting that becoming mature in IS 
management will somehow result in immediate improvements in IT security.  The 
processes that underlie changes in an organization’s IS management sophistication level 
are complex, and beyond the scope of this study.  Rather, the implication here is that 
practitioners should consider the sophistication of the IS management practices in an 
organization as part of the safeguard selection process. 
IT security practitioners also need to become more involved at the management 
level, integrating security considerations into improvements in overall IS management.  
While security practitioners may already be comfortable contributing to control aspects 
of IS management, they should also consider increasing their involvement in IS planning 
and organization activities.  As shown by Karimi et al. (2000), different types of steering 
committees (e.g., steering groups and policy committees) can positively influence various 
aspects of IS management maturity (e.g., planning and organization).  Security 
practitioners should consider participation in such committees where possible.  
Additionally, Gupta et al. (1997) demonstrates that organizations with different strategic 
orientations tend to emphasize different aspects of IS maturity.  Security practitioners 
should make use of increased involvement at the managerial level to consider these issues 
when examining the links between IS management practices and IT security. 
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Reasons for different IS management sophistication levels within organizations 
are beyond the scope of this paper, but are discussed widely in the IS academic literature.  
Competitive strategy (Gupta et al., 1997), age of specific IS functions (e.g. security) 
within the organization (Straub, 1990b), resource allocation (Karimi et al., 2000), 
external forces such as technological change and advancements in knowledge (King & 
Kraemer, 1984), and IS education or experience of top management (Karimi et al., 2001) 
may all be related to the maturity of IS management practices.  Other possibilities include 
organization size and stability, industry type, level of competition, and regulatory 
environment.  It seems likely that these factors may, in turn, influence an organization’s 
investment level in IT security.  However, it is often impractical for IS practitioners to 
directly affect many of these variables.  Therefore, IS practitioners should focus their 
efforts on ensuring a good match between the complexity of IT security safeguards and 
the IS management maturity level of the organization, taking into account the likelihood 
of growth and change. 
Finally, over 20% of participants disagreed with the survey questions regarding 
overall preventive and deterrent effects of IT security safeguards in the context of insider 
threats (Appendix A, Q14, Q15).  Thus, while the overall perception was that security 
safeguards are effective, a substantial number of respondents saw weaknesses in aspects 
of IT security related to protecting against insiders.  Practitioners may therefore want to 
focus additional effort on safeguards that address internal threats, such as stronger 
policies, more rigorous enforcement of those policies, and better access control 
procedures. 
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Summary 
This project empirically evaluated a model of the relation between IS 
practitioners’ perceptions of IS management maturity and their perceptions of IT security 
effectiveness.  Specifically, the perceived maturity of management practices related to IS 
planning, control, organization, and integration were tested for their association with the 
perceived effectiveness of security safeguards for IS hardware, software, data, and 
services, and for the overall perceived effect of deterrent and preventive safeguards.  The 
findings indicate that the respondents’ perceptions of maturity in management practices 
related to IS planning, control, and organization are positively associated with their 
perceptions of IT security effectiveness. 
The security of IT remains a complex matter, and the risk of breaches continues to 
be a problem (Richardson, 2003).  However, this study’s results would seem to indicate 
that current IT security safeguards are considered effective, at least by the sample of 
respondents who took part in this survey.  Ongoing efforts are therefore required from 
both researchers and practitioners to determine an appropriate level of attention for this 
matter.  In a time of heightened concern for security, management must assume 
accountability for the protection of vital IT assets, and ensure that protection for these 
assets is effective.  To do so, it is important to strike a balance, avoiding overzealous 
protection of IS, while not succumbing to the “naïve belief that bad things only happen to 
other people” (Loch et al., 1992, p. 185).  Moreover, given that mature IT infrastructure 
has become mission-critical to many modern organizations, Carr (2003) suggests that the 
next means of extracting strategic advantage from IS may be to focus attention on 
managing vulnerabilities rather than seeking new opportunities.  Finally, the results 
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presented here imply that IT security practitioners should not underestimate the value of 
time spent in so-called soft-skill tasks, especially where they involve management 
control, organization, or planning activities. 
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Appendix A 
 Survey Instrument 
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This appendix presents the research instrument used in this study.  The following 
two tables (see Table 29 and Table 30) translate the construct items and the short item 
descriptions used throughout the text to the questions used in the questionnaire. 
 
 
Table 29  Instrument questions for independent variable 
Item Item Description Question Number 
Maturity Integration 1 IT is strategic 23 
Maturity Integration 2 Top down planning 24 
Maturity Integration 3 IT in business units 25 
Maturity Integration 4 New IT introduction 26 
Maturity Organization 0 Ideas of IT personnel 28 
Maturity Organization 1 Ideas of end users 29 
Maturity Organization 2 IT knows business 30 
Maturity Organization 3 IT group structure 31 
Maturity Organization 4 End user relations 32 
Maturity Control 1 IT direction authority 34 
Maturity Control 2 IT operations authority 35 
Maturity Control 3 IT proposals appraised 36 
Maturity Control 4 IT performance 37 
Maturity Control 5 Clear IT goals 38 
Maturity Control 6 Clear IT performance 39 
Maturity Planning 1 IT supports business  41 
Maturity Planning 2 Examine IT innovation 42 
Maturity Planning 3 Inform current IT 43 
Maturity Planning 4 Inform potential IT 44 
Maturity Planning 5 Org. informed about IT 45 
Maturity Planning 6 IT project priorities  46 
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Table 30  Instrument questions for dependent variable 
Item Item Description Question Number 
Security 1 Security of hardware 10 
Security 2 Security of software 11 
Security 3 Security of data 12 
Security 4 Security of services 13 
Security 5 Deter insiders 14 
Security 6 Deter outsiders 16 
Security 7 Prevent insiders 15 
Security 8 Prevent outsiders 17 
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Appendix B 
 Survey Notices and Reminders 
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An Opportunity to Influence IS Security Practices in Canada 
 
Despite all the attention paid to IS security in recent years, little consideration has been given to 
what you, the Canadian IS practitioner, have to say about this important issue.  Here is a unique 
opportunity to express your opinions about the ways in which IS management practices affect IS 
security, and to see how your views compare with those of other Canadian IS practitioners. 
 
I invite you to participate in an upcoming study on how IS management practices affect IS 
security.  It will only take about 20 minutes of your time, and you will not be asked to provide 
any sensitive technical information or confidential details about your organization’s 
security practices.  The survey forms a key part of my Master’s thesis at The University of 
Lethbridge in Alberta, and is purely a non-commercial, academic undertaking.  As a participant, 
you are entitled to a free copy of the final report that can be shared openly and used to compare 
your ideas with those of other Canadian IS practitioners.  I will respond to any specific queries 
that you may have about the study or its findings, and every participant is eligible to participate in 
a draw for a valuable gift certificate. 
 
I am currently preparing an online questionnaire that will be straightforward and easy to use.  
There will be measures in place to properly protect the information you provide, and it will be 
used only for the purpose of academic research into IS management and security.  Additionally, 
The Faculty of Management Research and Ethics Committee at The University of Lethbridge has 
reviewed this study for conformance to acceptable ethical guidelines and standards. 
 
I will be announcing the survey in approximately two weeks (on or about 20 June), at which time 
the link to the questionnaire site will be made available to you.  I hope that you will be part of this 
important study.  If you have any questions, please contact me at the email address provided 
below. 
 
Thank you, 
Garry Spicer 
M.Sc. (Mgt) Candidate 
The University of Lethbridge 
Garry.Spicer@Uleth.ca 
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Study on IS Management and IS Security Effectiveness in Canada 
 
Despite all the attention paid to IS security in recent years, little consideration has been given to 
what you, the Canadian IS practitioner, have to say about this important issue.  Here is a unique 
opportunity to express your opinions about the ways in which IS management practices affect IS 
security, and to see how your views compare with the aggregated perspectives of other Canadian 
IS practitioners. 
 
The web survey is straightforward and easy to use, so I invite you to participate by following the 
link provided below.  It will only take about 20 minutes of your time, and you will not be asked 
to provide any sensitive technical information. There are measures in place to make certain 
that the information you provide is properly protected, and it will be used strictly for the purposes 
of academic research into IS management and IS security.  This study has been considered and 
approved by The Faculty of Management Research and Ethics Committee at The University of 
Lethbridge, and conforms to acceptable ethical guidelines and standards as described in the Tri-
Council Policy Statement for the ethical conduct of research involving humans. 
 
This important research will help us to better understand how to improve Information Systems 
management and security here in Canada.  As a participant, you are entitled to a free copy of the 
study results, which you may find useful for comparing your views to averages from across the 
country.  Additionally, I will respond to any specific queries that you may have about the report’s 
contents.  Finally, every one who completes a survey is eligible to participate in a draw for one of 
four $50 gift certificates from <deleted>. 
 
To complete the survey, please follow this link (you will need the ID and Password, below): 
 
  http://fusion.uleth.ca/crdc/spicer_survey/ 
 
Userid: <deleted> 
Password: <deleted> 
 
If you have any questions or concerns, please contact me at the email address provided below. 
 
 
Thank you, 
Garry Spicer 
M.Sc. (Mgt) Candidate 
The University of Lethbridge 
Garry.Spicer@Uleth.ca 
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Reminder: Study on IS Management and IS Security Effectiveness in Canada 
 
In a previous message, I invited you to provide your input to this important study on how IS 
management practices influence IS security effectiveness.  If you have already completed the 
online questionnaire, then I thank you for your time and wish you the best of luck in the prize 
draw that will take place soon after the survey web site is closed.  However, if you have not yet 
completed the survey, then I hope you will consider doing so.  It will only take about 20 minutes 
of your time, and you will not be asked to provide any sensitive technical information. 
 
This valuable research will help us to better understand how to improve Information Systems 
management and security here in Canada.  As a participant, you are entitled to a free copy of the 
study results, which you may find useful for comparing your views to averages from across the 
country.  Additionally, I will respond to any specific queries that you may have about the report’s 
contents. 
 
The web survey is straightforward and easy to use, so I invite you to participate by following the 
link below.  There are measures in place to protect the information you provide, and it will be 
used strictly for the purposes of academic research into IS management and security.  This study 
has been considered and approved by The Faculty of Management Research and Ethics 
Committee at The University of Lethbridge. 
 
The survey web site closes on 18 July, so be sure to take advantage of this opportunity before 
then.  Finally, do not forget that every one who completes a survey is eligible to participate in a 
draw for one of four $50 gift certificates from <deleted>. 
 
To complete the survey, please follow this link (you will need the ID and Password, below): 
 
   http://fusion.uleth.ca/crdc/spicer_survey/ 
 
Userid: <deleted> 
Password: <deleted> 
 
If you have any questions or concerns, please contact me at the email address provided below. 
 
 
Thank you, 
Garry Spicer 
M.Sc. (Mgt) Candidate 
The University of Lethbridge 
Garry.Spicer@Uleth.ca 
 
 
 
